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ABSTRACT 
This thesis uses industrial discourse analysis and fan studies to posit that fandom has the 
power to intervene in moments when producers and brands thwart expectations generated by in-
dustrial lore. Steve Jobs’ “Four Quadrants” strategy became a crucial piece of Apple’s industrial 
lore is shown to influence the expectations of Apple fans. Negative fan reactions to new product 
launches will be used to demonstrate the impact of said lore and the openings it creates for dis-
sent. Analysis of the industrial discourse surrounding the discontinued iMac Pro and redesigned 
Mac Pro determines the efficacy of fan interventions in eliciting a concession from Apple. 
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1 INTRODUCTION   
This thesis will examine the discourse surrounding two high-end desktop computers released by 
Apple, Inc. in the late 2010s as continuations of the company’s “Pro” product line. Apple’s use 
of the term “Pro” for high-end products began in the early 2000s following Steve Jobs’ return to 
the organization and his creation of the Four Quadrant product marketing strategy. This strategy 
divided the company’s Mac family of products by their desktop or portable form factor and their 
target audiences, which Jobs defined as a dichotomy between “Consumer” and “Pro” customers. 
This strategic construction served the company throughout the 2000s and early 2010s, until it 
was faced with manufacturing constraints that delayed updates to their most specialized desktop: 
the Mac Pro. As a result of these constraints, Apple launched the iMac Pro in 2017 and almost 
immediately faced a backlash from its most ardent fans who felt that the product insufficiently 
served “Pro” users and blurred the boundaries of the company’s Four Quadrant strategy. Their 
demands for a more “Pro” Mac better suited to their needs which fit more neatly within the com-
pany’s previously defined quadrants resulted in a rare apology and strategic concession from the 
corporation. By evaluating the intersection of Apple’s industrial lore and the expectations and 
interventions from the so-called “Cult of Mac,” this thesis presents a potential opening for fan 
dissent within an increasingly corporatized media environment. 
Steve Jobs returned to Apple Inc. in 1998 and brought the company from the brink of bank-
ruptcy to its lauded position as the leading manufacturer of computers as lifestyle marketing ob-
jects. The firm’s MacBook Pro and Mac Pro products have become prominent status symbols 
among technology workers and creative professionals (Marwick, 2013). As these sectors became 
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driving forces in the neoliberal economy, Apple and its “Pro” products gained considerable influ-
ence over the definition of professionalism within creative labor. From its position as the fourth-
largest supplier of desktop personal computers (PCs) and the only mainstream manufacturer of 
PCs running an operating system other than Microsoft’s Windows, Apple has an outsize ability 
to set the course for an industry in constant transition (Potuck, 2021). Competitors often copy 
their industrial designs and they have directly influenced the desktop PC form factor as we know 
it today (Schaefer & Durham, 2007). Thus, any radical change the company makes to its prod-
ucts is subject to intense scrutiny from both the industry trade press and its notoriously devoted 
and outspoken customer base. As one of the most studied consumer groups in western culture 
over the past two decades, this fandom has had a considerable impact on the shape of fan studies 
within academia. Their propensity for promoting Apple products lead to widespread adoption of 
the term “Brand Evangelist” after it was coined by Apple marketing executive Guy Kawasaki 
(Kawasaki, 2015). However, since the death of founder and CEO Steve Jobs, Apple has experi-
enced less full-throated evangelism from some of the most devoted sections of their base. 
Beginning with the original iMac in 1998 and continuing through the development of 
more mobile platforms such as the iPod, iPhone, and iPad, Apple has closed off the internal com-
ponents of their hardware devices. Schaefer & Durham (2007) have referred to this as the efface-
ment of the computing device. This effacement spurred protest movements and even appeals for 
regulation from fans and users who advocate for a “right to repair” or modify the internal compo-
nents of their devices (Rosa-Aquino, 2020). Fans have become increasingly frustrated as Apple 
has perpetuated this trend of effacement and spread their particularly limiting form of aesthetic 
minimalism to more product lines. Their attempts to enforce planned obsolescence and discour-
age end-user modification ultimately backfired with the 2013 Mac Pro, which fans derisively 
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nicknamed “The Trash Can.” As a symbol of effacement, a functionally limited computing de-
vice, and a chronically stagnant product, The Trash Can became the catalyst for a unique mo-
ment of fan rebellion. Through a months-long discussion via podcasts, blogs, YouTube videos, 
and other elements of convergence culture, Apple’s “professional” fans generated enough nega-
tive press to force the company to concede and backtrack on their campaign of effacement. The 
success of this campaign, I will argue, is due to both its timing and its use of previously estab-
lished industrial lore promoted by Apple and its executives. 
Wendy Chun has illustrated in Updating to Remain the Same that technology vendors 
must continually update their products and services to remain relevant in the neoliberal econo-
mies of the west. This constant updating creates what she calls a cycle of crises, which cuts 
through the typical information flow by “differentiating the temporally and temporarily valuable 
from the mundane, offering…users a taste of real-time responsibility and empowerment” (Chun, 
2016). When faced with a rupture in their cycle of controlled crises, Apple attempted to regain 
control by redefining the “professional” customer for their Mac Pro product line. However, their 
new definition was met with resistance by customers and members of the Mac fandom. The com-
pany then prematurely canceled a flagship product and returned to the more traditional definition 
of professionalism supported by their most vocal fans and customers.  
Examining this moment of resistance on behalf of the Mac fandom through the lens of fan 
studies and considering recent scholarship on the media industries demonstrates an opening for 
greater consumer agency during periods of technological and strategic change. By repeatedly 
voicing concerns through fan-owned channels, the so-called “Cult of Mac” established their 
agency as consumers and demanded significant changes to the objects of their fandom. This 
campaign turned some of Apple’s most renowned brand evangelists into critical mavens whose 
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pleas for a more professional Mac caught the ear of senior leadership inside the company. An 
analysis of how these fans conducted a months-long discursive battle over the nature of the term 
“professional” and its implications for computer hardware design demonstrates how consumers 
can advocate for companies to produce goods better suited for their needs. 
John H. Takamura Jr. has studied the relationship between Apple’s hardware designs and 
the loyalty consumers have towards the brand. He proposes a conceptual framework of branding 
which imagines corporations’ value proposition as a molecule of DNA. In this Brand DNA, “the 
product attributes together with the brand attributes work in coordination…to build the overall 
consumer experience, ultimately leading to and or maximizing brand loyalty” (Takamura, 2007). 
From surveys with Apple brand loyalists, Takamura developed a molecular model of Apple’s 
brand based on the prevalence of specific qualities and keywords used to justify the purchase of 
computer hardware. Perhaps unsurprisingly, “professionalism” and “creativity” were among the 
qualities most frequently praised by Apple’s loyal customers. Takamura (2007) explains: 
The ‘professional’ category contained approximately 14 words pertaining to a profes-
sional, elite, and high-end quality of the brand…The ‘professional ‘category is asso-
ciated with the ‘creative’ category as creative professionals use Apple™ products and 
have become associated with the product. This observation reoccurred throughout the 
study. The ‘creative’ category relates to the group category in that many loyalists 
viewed creatives as a niche group targeted by Apple™. 
In other words, professionalism and creativity were viewed as core elements of Apple’s Brand 
DNA (see Figure 1). These qualities were often interrelated as loyalists tended to perceive Ap-
ple’s target market as primarily composed of “creative professionals.” 
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Figure 1: Apple Brand DNA Molecule 
Note: The Apple brand DNA molecule as a 3-dimensional reassessment of the 
brand analysis bubble diagram and the resulting relationships between the funda-
mental elements of the brand. (Takamura, 2007) 
Takamura doesn’t identify which professions are deemed creative by Apple or its customers. 
Still, his Brand DNA model demonstrates that this amorphous collection of laborers is at the core 
of Apple’s target market. In his conception of Apple’s Brand DNA, Takamura links more tradi-
tional perceptions of the brand’s utility to aesthetic qualities, such as simplicity, via product de-
sign. He explains that “Design as one small element within the Apple™ brand DNA molecule 
can potentially alter the entire Apple product genome through its relationship and connection 
with the other elements of creative, dependable, technology, professional, group, and simplicity” 
(Takamura, 2007). Thus, to understand the impact of any given product’s design, we must ana-
lyze its aesthetic qualities (i.e., simplicity, color, materials, etc.) and its functional characteristics 
as a computing device. 
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Vilonia Rindova (2007) draws on Bourdieu's theory of cultural capital to argue for what she 
terms “cultural consumption,” which is “the consumption of products for their ‘art utili-
ties’…This type of consumption fuels the demand for original products, thereby contributing to 
the processes of value creation through innovation….” The ability to judge a product’s original-
ity arises from what Rindova calls a “connoisseurship consumption logic,” wherein consumers 
leverage their knowledge of functional design trends and ideological stances to differentiate be-
tween products. She specifically mentions Apple’s products as an exemplar of such connoisseur-
ship, stating that “by creating products that vary in design form, technical architecture, and even 
intellectual tradition, Apple’s computers can be viewed as objects of connoisseurship and cul-
tural consumption” (Rindova, 2007). According to her analysis, Apple customers derive cultural 
capital from both the act of purchasing a Macintosh and their demonstration of connoisseurship 
in choosing the “correct” Mac model.  
Rindova (2007) goes on to argue that “Originality in form or in the combination of function 
and form increases the value of products as objects of cultural consumption because it enables 
consumers to test their judgments of value in the absence of proven basis for such judgments.” 
Thus, it is incumbent upon Apple to consistently create Macintosh computers that demonstrate 
originality in form, function, or a combination of the two to maintain the brand’s standing 
amongst connoisseurs. Rindova refers to the methods a company uses to support this originality 
as their “innovation strategy,” which “can be understood as combining both technological and 
cultural research and emphasizing “new concept” development, as much as new technological 
design development.” She notes that vendors can occasionally bolster their reputation for innova-
tion in established fields such as automobile manufacturing and PC design by producing unex-
pected aesthetic designs that elide otherwise orthodox functionality. Apple’s admission that they 
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“backed themselves into a thermal corner” (Panzarino & Dillet, 2017) with the 2013 “Trash 
Can” Mac Pro demonstrates the potential downside of this particular innovation strategy. In plac-
ing a heavy emphasis on aesthetic innovation, the company created an industrial design incapa-
ble of intermittent functional improvements that would maintain its reputation amongst connois-
seurs and professional users as “innovators” in the desktop computer market. 
Apple solidified its reputation as an innovator in the industrial design of computer hard-
ware with the original iMac, which debuted in 1998. After a few drastic re-iterations during the 
transition to flat-screen monitors, the iMac product line arrived at the origin of its current design 
with the launch of the G5 version in 2004 (See Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Timeline of the Product Design of the Apple iMac (1998-2021) 
Note: The iMac G3 (1998) was the first product line designed around the computer’s 
integrated CRT monitor. From the iMac G4 (2002) onward, the computer has used 
various “flat screen” display technologies. The iMac G5 (2004), as analyzed by 
Schaefer & Durham (2007), has been the basis for all subsequent iMacs, including the 
iMac Pro (2017). (Piccoli Trapletti, 2015) 
Schaefer & Durham (2007) have examined the social implications of the G5 iMac’s all-in-one 
design. The computational hardware of the device is mounted directly to the back of the monitor 
and hidden away by an opaque chassis. They argue that “The seeming immateriality of its design 
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numbs users to the presence of the machine as well as the implications of its reality” (Schaefer & 
Gigi Durham, 2007). They go on to evaluate Apple’s marketing materials for the machine, which 
use language typically reserved for modern art pieces and works of architecture. This language 
instills a belief that “The purchase of a Mac product distinguishes buyers as subjects who appre-
ciate beauty and simplicity via association with the brand…The consumer buys into the Mac life-
style by purchasing this ‘perfect computer’” (Schaefer & Gigi Durham, 2007). This emphasis on 
the supposed beauty and simplicity in hardware aesthetics guided the iMac product line through 
the 2010s and presented a significant selling point for the iMac Pro.  
Eisenman (2013) has documented a u-shaped relationship between technical innovation in 
technology products and their design-related attributes. He notes that hardware aesthetics are em-
phasized when a new category launches and later in its life cycle when a product category is ma-
ture (Eisenman, 2013). Once a category reaches what Eisenman calls its “dominant design,” sub-
tle visible changes signal difference between minor revisions, wherein  
“Users are able to easily identify which other users have the most current model rela-
tive to those who have older models. This creates a “coffee shop” effect of sorts where 
users express something about their identities by self-categorizing into a pecking order 
based on attributing higher status to users with later models” (Eisenman, 2013) 
I contend that when faced with continued supply chain delays affecting the manufacturing of a 
new Mac Pro, Apple-designed and marketed the iMac Pro as a revision on their long-running 
iMac design to capitalize on this coffee shop effect. From the introduction of the aluminum chas-
sis iMac in 2012 until 2021, the only change Apple made to the iMac was to occasionally slim 
down the computer’s curved back as the miniaturization of internal components allowed (Snell, 
2020a). When viewed as an iteration in the history of the iMac product line and the nine-year 
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stagnation in chassis design, the iMac Pro demonstrates a belief within Apple that the desktop 
computer had reached the low point of Eisenman’s u-shaped curve and settled upon its “domi-
nant design.” It is telling then that Apple made no alterations to the existing form-factor when 
developing the iMac Pro. The design team seems to have believed that by simply anodizing the 
aluminum in a darker hue, they could generate the sort of coffee shop effect Eisenman discusses 
without investing in a complete redesign. 
To understand why the drastic design changes of the Mac Pro and iMac Pro were so con-
troversial, we must also analyze customer perceptions of Apple and their beliefs about the com-
pany’s “Pro” hardware lines. Wang, Sakar & Sakar (2018) examined the company’s customer 
base during this period and found that its most devoted consumers and fans considered Apple to 
be a “sacred brand.” They defined brand sacredness as “the extent of a brand being perceived of 
possessing extraordinary and spiritual properties inspiring veneration that would make the brand 
distinct from other brands in the eyes of a group of brand devotees” (Wang et al., 2018). Accord-
ing to their analysis of Apple, specific individuals within a brand’s audience move beyond mere 
loyalty to a form of attachment wherein the brand and its purported values become a part of the 
extended self. Wang et al. note that devotees often see products created by competing companies 
as inferior (even profane) in comparison to the sacred brand. They also find that the procession 
of an individual from loyal customer to devoted brand believer and evangelist creates a sense of 
“known group validity,” which allows them to distinguish between fans of different communities 
or sects falling under the same corporate brand. Under this model, “Pro” Apple users are among 
the most devoted of the brand’s believers/customers. Their perceived “known group validity” al-
lowed them to separate themselves from the Windows PC market and even the more general Ap-
ple fan base. However, when the company began making drastic changes to their “Pro” product 
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lines, the enthusiasm these fans felt for the Mac quickly morphed into a sense of abandonment. 
Many of these devotees would scoff at such emphatic language, though, since the cultural norms 
of the technology and creative industries frame all consumption through a lens of entrepreneurial 
pragmatism.  
In his ethnographic analysis of technology workers in New York’s Silicon Alley during the 
early 2000s, Andrew Ross divides the laborers who support technology sector businesses into 
two groups: No-Collar workers such as copywriters, designers, and other creatives as opposed to 
administrative workers who are responsible for more traditional business tasks, such as sales, 
HR, or data entry. No-Collar workers, according to his definition, are “knowledge workers 
whose high-tech skills or aptitude for problem-solving wins them a measure of autonomy in a 
data-rich workplace…[a No-Collar worker] exercises self-management, if not self-employment, 
in the execution of their work; and who is accustomed to a contingent and casual work environ-
ment...” (Ross, 2003). For many of these workers, he argues, autonomy includes a sense of mas-
tery over the technological tools of the modern workplace.  
According to Ross, one of the critical examples of this division of labor is each side’s re-
sponse to Moore’s Law. Named for an observation spoken by Gordon Moore, the co-founder of 
Fairchild Semiconductor, Moore’s Law is a commonly cited piece of technology industry lore 
that states that computing hardware gets ever smaller and faster as a function of time, typically 
doubling every year (Moore, 1965). Ross uses Moore’s Law to demonstrate the separation be-
tween the two classes of labor that support the technology industry and its adjacent creative 
fields: 
“Yet for most employees who perform routine work with computers, Moore’s Law 
simply translates into speedup on the job. It is not in their interests to go any faster... 
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For no-collar employees, on the other hand, who fall above the knowledge labor di-
vide, it is generally in their interests to have quicker machines, larger storage densities, 
and higher-speed access to internet resources. For them, Moore’s Law is usually per-
ceived as a benign principle, authorizing faster tools that allow them to further master 
and customize their work environment” (Ross, 2003) 
In this construction personal computers become something akin to a craft tool for No-Collar 
Workers. Rather than viewing themselves as laborers within an industrialized process, they ap-
proach work as an almost existential challenge. Mastery of ever-faster tools allows for higher 
productivity and more significant states of so-called flow. For No Collar workers in the early 
2000s and the various classifications of “knowledge workers” or “creative professionals” that 
followed them, this cultural justification of work as existential meaning and its attendant obses-
sion with ever-faster hardware has meant a constant race keep up with Moore’s Law. Using and 
mastering ever faster smaller or otherwise more “powerful” hardware has become crucial to 
maintaining cultural relevance and employment opportunities within these fields. 
Alice Marwick builds on Ross’s discussions of workplace bravado in her ethnographic study 
of Silicon Valley workers in the 2010s. She notes that during this period, the consumption of 
functional objects, including Apple computers, became a status symbol within the Silicon Valley 
technology worker subculture. During her field research, she observed tech industry culture in 
which “spending on clothes or luxury brand names for everyday goods was terribly gauche,” 
however, “Apple products were an exception since electronics were considered necessary work 
tools.” (Marwick, 2013). She notes that members of the Silicon Valley subculture are also quick 
to recognize the make and model of others’ devices at the various networking events she at-
tended during her research. The ideological exception carved out for work tools in general and 
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Apple products, in particular, should be considered in analyzing the various “Pro” tier Macintosh 
computers. In conjunction with Eisenman’s so-called coffee shop effect, this suggests that Apple 
was attempting to capitalize on the aspirational qualities of their brand. Product design decisions 
such as releasing a high-end device in an exclusive color allow easy visual separation between its 
supposedly ‘pro’ users and the ‘consumers’ using non-’ pro’ products with their ubiquitous silver 
aluminum chassis.  
This thesis will demonstrate Apple’s adoption of the Four Quadrants product marketing strat-
egy as industrial lore and how their failure to follow this lore when designing new “Pro” prod-
ucts in the late 2010s lead to a revolt amongst their users. The first section of this analysis serves 
as a brief introduction to the corporate strategy of Apple in the 1990s and 2000s to demonstrate 
the significance of Steve Jobs’ Four Quadrants strategy. The second section analyzes discourse 
about the nature of the “Professional” within the Apple fandom during the 2010s and how fan 
frustrations stemmed from the company’s previously communicated strategy. The third and final 
section contains analyses of two “Pro” desktop computers released by Apple during this period 
which demonstrate the company’s evolving strategic priorities and concessions to fan criticism. 
This thesis will conclude with a brief discussion of the potential effectiveness of fan intervention 
during moments of industrial crisis, particularly when corporate strategy runs counter to previ-
ously established industrial lore. 
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2 THE FOUR QUADRANTS; A HISTORY OF THE MACINTOSH AND APPLES IN-
DUSTRIAL LORE 
To establish the importance placed on Jobs’ Four Quadrants strategy within Apple and its fan-
dom, this section will establish the origins of this key piece of industrial lore. I will begin by re-
viewing the strategic and financial challenges which resulted in Apple’s acquisition of NEXT 
and the reinstatement of Steve Jobs as CEO in the late 1990s. Particular attention will be paid to 
the company’s decision to license the Macintosh Operating System (Mac OS) to third-party 
hardware manufacturers who built machines to serve the needs of specific professional niches, 
particularly in the print design industry. This period will serve as the baseline for discussing 
Jobs’ radical decision to cancel these so-called “Mac clone” agreements and implement the 
“Four Quadrant” strategy for PC product marketing. A review of brand sacralization and deifica-
tion will explain how this decision became an irrefutable element of Jobs’ persona, particularly 
after his death from pancreatic cancer in 2012. The chapter will then demonstrate how Apple 
drifted away from the Four Quadrant strategy, particularly after the transition to using Intel-
based processors for their Mac hardware in the late 2000s. This transition, it will be argued, cre-
ated an external dependency that forced Apple to delay multiple product releases and resulted in 
a more diverse product line than Jobs’ would have intended. This tension between fan percep-
tions of Apple’s historical strategies, the lore of Jobs, and the realities of an Intel-based product 
line set the stage for the iMac Pro controversy analyzed in subsequent chapters. 
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2.1 Industrial Lore Methodology 
To define the term “Pro,” relative to Apple’s Mac Pro and iMac Pro product lines the company’s 
infrequent and notoriously cryptic public announcements must be analyzed through a media in-
dustries framework. Given the scarcity of internal documentation available and the company’s 
notoriously tight-lipped executive team, a close reading of press releases, corporate events, and 
interviews published by trade publications will allow for the best understanding of their internal 
logic and strategies. Particular attention will be paid to the demonstrations and reviews Apple 
sanctions from third-party software vendors and trade publications before releasing new hard-
ware. Though CEO Tim Cook ends each product launch by saying he “can’t wait to see what you 
do with it,” the company frequently telegraphs the intended uses for its hardware products 
through these demonstrations. They also illustrate the intended audience for each product 
through the promotional materials accompanying their press releases and the small but eclectic 
set of influencers and trade publications that receive free hardware to test and review. 
Timothy Havens has argued for an analysis of this sort of corporate discourse, which gives cre-
dence to laborers’ agency within the context of structuring factors such as industrial economics 
and political circumstance. In his chapter, “Towards a Structuration Theory of Media Intermedi-
aries,” Havens adapts Turow’s concept of “power roles” to identify individuals within media or-
ganizations whose interpretations of and actions within structural circumstances create what he 
calls “industry lore.” As discussed, and acted upon, by said intermediaries this lore serves as a 
Foucauldian “regime of truth” under which the globalized media industry operates. The process 
of industry lore influencing actions taken by individuals whose success or failure is then re-inter-
preted as evidence for or against said lore is what Havens refers to as structuration. This structu-
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ration process, he argues, causes industrial lore to “[shape] cultural resources that perhaps bil-
lions of human beings draw upon in making sense of their lives and the world around them” 
(Havens, 2014). 
Upon Steve Jobs’ return to Apple in 1997, he introduced a product marketing framework 
known as the Four Quadrants to simplify the company’s bloated Macintosh product lines. The 
Four Quadrants, as demonstrated below, are laid out in a grid with Desktop & Portable on the X-
Axis and Consumer & Professional on the Y-Axis (Jobs, 1998).  
Table 1: Four Quadrant Strategy Diagram 
 Consumer Professional 
Desktop iMac ? 
Portable MacBook MacBook Pro 
(Adapted from Jobs, 1998) 
This framework led to the quintessential Apple branding nomenclature of X “Pro,” as in “Mac-
Book Pro,” which separated its entry-level consumer-grade products from more expensive offer-
ings in nearly all its product categories. When viewed through the lens of Havens’ structuration 
theory, it is apparent that Apple’s executive leadership team perpetuated this framework as a 
piece of internal industrial lore, at least until 2018. Havens notes that “industry lore is specific to 
the cultural industries and arises from unique features of those industries—namely the unknowa-
bility of audience preferences, exorbitant costs of production, and highly unpredictable success 
of cultural commodities” (Havens, 2014). The iMac Pro revealed that the professional market 
Apple believed they knew was, in fact, less monolithic than their lore suggested. ‘Pros’ were less 
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concerned with hardware aesthetics than Jony Ive’s notoriously minimalistic industrial design 
group. Even the “creative professionals” who served as Apple’s primary market in the 1990s 
were critical of the new machine. They were particularly concerned about its lack of modularity 
and upgradability. Though they may have been as excited as Apple hoped about the new dark 
grey exterior, “pros” were more focused on function than form and felt that Apple should be too. 
Adopting the term “pro” is reminiscent of other ambiguous descriptors used to delineate 
different product categories, particularly the phrase “quality” as it refers to television program-
ming. Travis Vogan has written about the rise of so-called quality television and its pervasion of 
industrial discourses around programming, including cable sports. He argues that ESPN began 
producing documentaries and other “quality” or “prestige” content in the mid-2000s as part of an 
effort to differentiate themselves from competitors, like Fox Sports. They were gaining more live 
event broadcast rights. Around this time, ESPN began referring to themselves as the “Worldwide 
Leader in Sports,” a moniker that traded on their dual strategy of live coverage and “quality” pre-
recorded programs such as the award-winning docuseries 30 for 30. The flexibility of program-
ming these so-called evergreen productions around live events was an added benefit which “to 
secure ESPN’s industrial authority and cultural prominence in sports media while complement-
ing the live content that draws its biggest audiences and largest advertising rates” (Vogan, 2018). 
ESPN’s use of terms like “quality” here and their self-ascribed leadership in television sports is 
like Apple’s initial pitch for the iMac Pro. John Ternus and others repeatedly discussed the “in-
novation” of housing “workstation-grade” components inside the iMac’s slim all-in-one chassis. 
They even went out of their way to call it “the most powerful Mac ever made,” knowing that 
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their Mac Pro would later upstage it. Like ESPN’s assertions of “quality,” this hyperbolic lan-
guage worked to strengthen the overall Apple brand despite their risky maneuver into an uncer-
tain product category. 
2.2 Origins of the Four Quadrants 
To understand the origins of the Four Quadrants strategy, we must revisit the troubles Apple 
faced during the 1990’s when a rapid succession of CEO’s and a bloated product line brought the 
company to the edge of bankruptcy. Beckman & Harris (2007) have conducted a historiographic 
analysis of Apple which pays particular attention to this era and its impact on the company’s 
strategic goals at the beginning of the 21st century. They draw from interviews and biographies 
of key Apple executives to reconstruct the events of the period, particularly an autobiography of 
CEO Gil Amelio who served in the role for a mere 500 days and is best known for overseeing 
the acquisition of Jobs’ upstart firm NEXT. In his book, Amelio explains that “Apple had no 
clear corporate strategy, no statement of direction that could be used as a basis of deciding which 
businesses the company should be in and which not, which markets we should be pursuing and 
which ignoring” (Amelio & Simon, 1998). Beckman & Harris interpret such statements as indi-
cations that Apple had moved away from its core values and customer orientation, which empha-
sized the creation of approachable appliance-like computers over the technological arms race 
mentality more common at firms like IBM and Compaq. “As a consequence,” they explain, “Ap-
ple attempted to attack every product niche, and ended up with a bewildering assortment of mi-
nutely different models which led to consumer confusion” (Beckman & Harris, 2007). 
 Apple’s attempts to “attack” every product niche during the period fell into two equally 
confusing endeavors: the Performa series and a short-lived licensing program which allowed 
third-party hardware vendors to build computers that ran Macintosh software. The so-called 
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“Mac Clones” manufactured by specialized vendors like Power Computing and Daystar Digital 
promised customers more customizable specifications and cutting-edge components. The licens-
ing of the Macintosh operating system was hailed as the future of the platform when the program 
began in early 1995, but by the time Jobs returned in 1997 Mac Clones were thought to be a 
drain on Apple’s brand value (Beckman & Harris, 2007; Piller, 1995). Longtime Apple column-
ist Jason Snell remembers the Mac Clone era as “a fundamental misunderstanding of what even 
confused, beleaguered mid-’90s Apple was… Apple has always been about combining hardware 
and software together…[which] made Apple so frustrating to investors and business analysts” 
(Snell, 2020c).  
The company’s first-party hardware strategy during this period was equally confusing. Un-
der Michael Spindler (CEO from 1993-96) the company’s emphasis shifted from hardware build 
quality towards time-to-market, meaning that Apple would issue incremental updates to its vari-
ous products as quickly as component manufacturers could ship new chips. This resulted in 
bloated product lines such as the low-end Performa series. At the time of its cancellation in-
cluded this line included over a dozen distinct products distinguishable only by their product 
numbers (i.e. Performa 6410 vs. Performa 6412) (Markoff, 1997). When Steve Jobs returned to 
the company in early 1997, he ordered that both the Clone program and the Performa line be dis-
continued. At the time these drastic measures were framed in terms of financial austerity due to 
Apple’s $1.6 billion in losses over the course of Gil Amelio’s 500 days as CEO (Beckman & 
Harris, 2007). However, Jobs’ solution to Apple’s strategic missteps wouldn’t become fully ap-
parent until the announcement of the original iMac at Macworld Expo in 1998.   
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During Jobs’ update on the state of Apple at that year’s expo he sought to reassure custom-
ers, journalists, and shareholders with a series of statistics demonstrating sales growth and finan-
cial gains since Amelio stepped down and he was named Interim CEO a year earlier. After at-
tempting to reassure existing stakeholders, Jobs turned to the future and began describing the 
company’s new product strategy. “We went back to business school 101,” he told the crowd, 
“and we said…’what do our customers want?’” (Jobs, 1998) He then outlined a division between 
“design and publishing customers” who primarily wanted higher end “pro” products while edu-
cational institutions were interested in lower end “consumer” products. Jobs combined this di-
chotomy with the two primary devices classes of the day, desktop and portable, to create what he 
called a “Four Quadrant” product strategy for Apple. Since the company was still primarily fo-
cused on the Macintosh platform and had yet to introduce hybrid devices such as the iPad, Jobs’ 
desktop and portable categories were easily defined and are still widely used in the industry to 
this day. However, the consumer and pro distinctions were and are less clearly defined both 
within Apple and across the industry. Jobs and Apple’s definitions of each side of this dichotomy 
were reflected in the company’s distribution channels during the period and in the demonstra-
tions of each product family which Jobs gave during his speech.  
Apple began selling products directly to consumers via Apple.com in November 1997 but 
had yet to break ground on their now ubiquitous retail stores. According to Apple’s 1998 annual 
report, the bulk of the company’s products were sold via third-parties including “wholesalers, re-
sellers, mass merchants, cataloguers and…education institutions” (Apple, Inc., 1998). While the 
report does not break down the mix of pro and consumer systems sold through each channel, 
Jobs’ comments seem to reflect internal knowledge of a pro customer base largely built around 
the creative industries who presumably purchased Mac’s wholesale via their employers or from 
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specialized catalogs and merchants. That educational institutions are called out as a separate 
sales channel and a key market for consumer products demonstrates an internal strategy in this 
market focused on delivering lower-performance hardware at lower prices. 
Jobs demonstrations of the new pro laptop product line, called PowerBooks, and his his-
toric unveiling of the iMac consumer desktop also reveal key elements of Apple’s product cate-
gorization strategy. During the PowerBook segment Jobs invites Phil Schiller, then Vice Presi-
dent of Worldwide Product Marketing, to aid him in conduct side-by-side speed tests of contem-
porary tasks which would have been computationally intensive for the era on two PowerBooks 
and an Intel Pentium based Windows laptop from Compaq. After testing an intensive filter appli-
cation in Adobe Photoshop and the playback of a complicated Flash animation on the Power-
Books, Jobs and Schiller conducted only performed the latter demonstration on the iMac. Even 
though both machines contained Apple’s latest G3 processor, the company demonstrated through 
this on-stage “showdown” that while the PowerBook was meant for production, the iMac was 
built for consumption. This is echoed in the announcement video for the iMac, which displays a 
litany of popular webpages zooming towards the viewer rather than a host of technical software 
demos (Jobs, 1998). Thus, from its inception alongside the iMac, the “pro” column in Apple’s 
four quadrant matrix has been differentiated primarily by the hardware’s intended use cases ra-
ther than any specific technical capabilities. However, specifications (or so-called “speeds and 
feeds”) were emphasized in the marketing of “pro” hardware to greater extent than in Apple’s 
consumer lineup. 
2.3 The Deification of Jobs 
The iMac’s massive success solidified Apple’s return to profitability and cemented Steve Jobs as 
the company’s permanent CEO until his death in 2011. During the intervening 13 years Jobs 
21 
built a reputation as the company’s primary spokesman and highly opinionated leader. Since his 
death the company, its employees, fans and pundits have lavished even more praise on Jobs with 
some expressing quasi-religious devotion to the late technologist. In their study of Apple fans in 
China, Liu & Wang (2020) found that they “regard Steve Jobs as a "divine", "godlike figure", 
"great leader", "spiritual mentor", and see him as an idol because of his “outstanding ability, in-
sight, and charming personality…Apple's devoted fans have developed a sense of awe towards 
its founder Steve Jobs and see him as the spiritual leader of Apple.” Thomas Streeter has argued 
that this deification extends beyond Apple’s fandom into the broader American psyche, which 
constructs Jobs as a “romantic computer entrepreneur” and an example of capitalism with per-
ceived integrity. In an analysis of discourse surrounding Jobs’ death and the invocation of his 
memory during the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election, Streeter explains: 
“The Jobs narrative offers the appealing vision of an idealized, productive, humane 
capitalism contrasted with the speculative, predatory kind of capitalism, unconnected 
to useful objects or activities, that appeared in the headlines after 2008. The name of 
Steve Jobs has become the symbol for the opposite of a Wall Street financial manipu-
lator. Jobs functions, not always but often, as a signifier of good capitalism, of indus-
trial capitalism with moral integrity. And in a world straining awkwardly, perhaps des-
perately, for ways to reconcile capitalist production with political democracy, that sig-
nifier can seem immensely useful and attractive”  (Streeter, 2015) 
When paired with the productivity focused values system of Ross’ No Collar Workers and the 
status consciousness of Alice Marwick’s Silicon Valley social media stars this narrative con-
structs Jobs as a mythic figure and the object of professional aspiration. His mannerisms become 
symbolic gestures and his infamously minimal sartorial style becomes a de facto uniform. In 
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other words, Jobs is constructed by the technology sector, and the American public at large, as a 
prophetic example of how to succeed in the evolving economy of 21st century capitalism. 
Jobs’ various public appearances and product launch presentations have been archived and re-
uploaded across the internet by Apple fans and technology blogs, many of whom quote from 
them extensively in contemporary coverage of Apple. Jobs’ utterances are frequently used as lev-
erage by fans when arguing against unpopular or unorthodox decisions Apple has made. Some-
times the revival of the CEO’s comments is used for comic effect, as when fans trotted out clips 
of Jobs railing against stylus input devices shortly after the announcement of the Apple Pencil 
(Statt, 2015). In more contentious periods, factions within the fandom have used Jobs quotes to 
support their side of disagreements, as was the case with the announcement of the iPad Pro. Dur-
ing this period fans of the Mac and the iPad each employed excerpts from a speech in which Jobs 
compared the use cases for the iPad and the Mac to cars and trucks respectively (Paczkowski, 
2013).  This adherence to Jobs’ words only further emphasizes his “divinity” within the commu-
nity. And since the original iMac was his first major product launch after returning to the com-
pany, the 1998 MacWorld Expo presentation is frequently cited as one of his most visionary mo-
ments. This has led many to dub the speech and the G3 iMac as the moment when Steve Jobs 
“saved” Apple (Hackett, 2012; Ingraham, 2019; Ravenscroft, 2019; Sharma, 2020; Snell, 2018). 
It is no wonder then that the strategy behind this revolutionary product, The Four Quadrants, 
would live on as a key piece of Apple’s industrial lore throughout the early 21st century. 
2.4 Delays and Drifts in the 2010s 
Apple’s second-generation Mac Pro, announced in 2013, marked a massive departure from the 
design of workstation grade computer hardware. The compact device was built around single 
vertically centered fan and heat sink which provided cooling to a triangular array of component 
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boards housing the computer’s Central Processing Unit (CPU) and two parallel Graphics Pro-
cessing Units (GPUs). This design was intended to capitalize on the combination of the CPU and 
one GPU to perform complex computational tasks while the second GPU delivered the graphical 
output of these tasks to an external display (Apple, Inc., 2013b). Its dual-GPU architecture and 
use of Intel’s high-end Xeon CPUs were the key technical features differentiating it from higher-
end configurations of the consumer-focused iMac.  
Promotional materials coinciding with the launch of the new line focused on the Mac 
Pro’s capabilities and potential uses in fields such as video editing, music production, visual arts 
and information technology systems as well as the device’s compact form factor (Apple, Inc., 
2013b). Press releases accompanying an internal update to the iMac released a month earlier fo-
cused on that computer’s “fun” design aesthetic (Apple, Inc., 2013a), while the press release for 
the Trash Can Mac Pro described an “efficient” and “radical” device for higher end users. The 
“radical” design was a cylinder of semi-reflective black aluminum encasing the computer which 
earned it a series of derisive nicknames, most prominently “The Trash Can.” The polarizing aes-
thetics of the machine proved to be the least of its problems as thermal issues related to its idio-
syncratic design and infrequent updates made it an object of derision amongst users, fans and 
tech journalists.  
In the late 2010s, advances in silicon transistor fabrication led to a significant step for-
ward in the miniaturization of computer processors. As competitors such as Samsung and Tai-
wan Semiconductor moved to smaller and more efficient 7 and 5 nanometer fabrication systems, 
Intel struggled to maintain consistent output in their 10 nanometer products (Leswing, 2020). In-
tel repeatedly delayed the launch of scheduled products and reported numerous shortages in ex-
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isting products which were used by desktop and laptop PCs from Apple and its various Win-
dows-based competitors. In 2019, CNBC reported that “Intel shares fell as much as 1.7% [in a 
single day] after both Dell and HP called out the chipmaker by name in earnings reports…” 
which showed declines in sales projections (Novet, 2019). Apple also blamed Intel for sales de-
clines in their laptop and desktop product lines, though their statements were more circumspect. 
Forbes reported on a comment from Tim Cook during a quarterly earnings call, in which he 
stated that “For our Mac business overall, we faced some processor constraints in the March 
quarter, leading to a 5 percent revenue decline compared to last year. But we believe that our 
Mac revenue would have been up compared to last year without those constraints, and don’t be-
lieve this challenge will have a significant impact on our Q3 results” (Spence, 2019). 
It is no coincidence that these slowdowns coincided with the period of frustration sur-
rounding the stagnation of the Trash Can Mac Pro. Many Apple fans and tech journalists specu-
lated throughout this period that the company’s plans for professional hardware were being ham-
pered by Intel’s production issues. As early as 2016, the hosts of the Accidental Tech Podcast 
tempered their complaints about Apple’s neglect of the Trash Can Mac Pro with remarks about 
Intel’s inconsistency. “If Apple decides to skip a [processor] generation…they’re setting them-
selves up for another 18 months with no update,” said Marco Arment, before adding that “it 
could be longer if there’s any delay on Intel’s side, which again, has been happening with in-
creasing frequency in recent years” (Arment et al., 2016a). Intel’s long-standing strategic ad-
vantage as the supplier of choice for high-end computer processors meant that most of the indus-
try watched their releases closely and sought out the latest chips when they became available. 
Thus, arguments such as Arment’s resurfaced repeatedly as Intel tried and failed to ship subse-
quent processor generations and Apple left the Mac Pro unmodified. It seemed that Apple’s veil 
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of secrecy had been pulled back by its reliance on third-party component suppliers whose pro-
duction timetables were readily available to the public, deepening the blows when the company 
repeatedly failed to deliver.  
In an industry built upon the principle of constant updates, as outlined by Chun, Apple’s 
failure to consistently iterate on their Mac Pro resulted in the product’s public perception declin-
ing throughout the late 2010’s. By the time it was discontinued in 2019, the “Trash Can” was 
considered an abject failure and an affront to the Pro Mac user community. Despite the ever-im-
proving technical capabilities of Apple’s lower-end Macs, the lore of the Four Quadrants dictated 
that the company should continue to update its most complex and expensive machines at roughly 
the same pace. Their failure to do so was seen by some within the community as both a strategic 
failure and an affront to the memory of Steve Jobs and the company they “believed in.”  
By the time Apple invited industry journalists to the company’s corporate headquarters for a 
“Mac Roundtable” event in 2017, the Trash Can Mac Pro had been on sale for over 1,000 days. 
These models were sold at the same prices and with the same internal hardware configurations 
that had launched the product line in 2013. In that same period of time Apple had updated its 
consumer-focused iMac lines four times including the release of the 5k iMac in 2014, which 
would serve as the industrial design model for the iMac Pro (Apple, Inc., n.d.). The imbalance in 
these update schedules caused many Mac fans to make the case that Apple had abandoned its 
most ardent supporters and forsaken Jobs’ Four Quadrant strategy. Some even went as far as ar-
guing that the company in general, and Tim Cook in particular, no longer cared about the Mac 
due to the runaway success of the iPhone and iPad. Phil Schiller attempted to directly dismiss 
this line of argument, saying that “We want to make sure everyone understands that not only do 
we believe in the Mac, but we believe in that product quadrant strategy…we want to excel in 
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every one of those quadrants” (Panzarino & Dillet, 2017). Fans’ ability to shape this discourse 
surrounding hardware updates by invoking the Four Quadrants clearly affected Apple’s leader-
ship team. So much so that they broke with the company’s renowned culture of secrecy to invite 
journalists into a hardware construction workspace to conduct the infamous roundtable inter-
view. The pressure exerted by Apple fans and their ultimate success in extracting an apology 
from the company at that event will be the subject of the next chapter.  
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3 BEGGING TO BE FLEECED, FAN INTERVENTIONS 
This chapter will establish the state of the professional Mac user community leading up to the 
mid-2010s and demonstrate the perceived stakes of Apple’s so-called “Mac malaise.” It will then 
illustrate the transition of Apple’s understanding of the Mac user community and how this came 
to conflict with the community’s views through a close reading of fan texts created by prominent 
voices within the Mac community. The analysis will also examine the anxiety within the “Pro” 
Mac user base about the rise of the “prosumer” category, particularly within the digital creative 
fields. This anxiety and the heated discourse it sparked on fan programs such as the Accidental 
Tech Podcast will be used to demonstrate how hierarchical definitions of “professionalism” were 
generated by technology workers during this period. This hierarchy, through which long-time 
fans attempted to determine who “deserves” a Pro Mac, will be analyzed regarding its tendency 
to reproduce reductive understandings of the value of labor.  
3.1 Fan Studies Methodology 
To understand the interventions undertaken by Mac users during the period under analysis, this 
section will adopt methodology from fan studies, including transmedia analysis and online eth-
nography. The research will demonstrate that these interventions were ultimately successful be-
cause fans subverted the containment measures Apple had created in response to more homoge-
nous fan engagement during a prior era in the company’s history. One of the critical elements of 
this analysis will be the progression of specific fans from vocal enthusiasts to trusted voices and 
eventual trade journalists within the technology industry. Apple’s reliance on the evangelism of 
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these individuals in the early 2000s gave them the platform within the Mac fandom that ulti-
mately enabled the protests surrounding the Mac Pro and iMac Pro during the period under anal-
ysis. 
In Convergence Culture, pioneering fan studies scholar Henry Jenkins adapts Pierre 
Lévy’s concept of “knowledge communities” to explain how individuals within fandom build 
cultural norms through knowledge sharing. Jenkins argues that this structure fits the fandoms of 
the social media age better than those of the previous broadcast area, as new technologies have 
allowed fans to collaborate more efficiently and distribute their works more broadly. A group of 
enthusiasts is not immediately a fandom or a community, he explains, as these formations require 
a few foundational elements: 
“Knowledge communities form around mutual intellectual interests; their members 
work together to forge new knowledge often in realms where no traditional expertise 
exists; the pursuit of and assessment of knowledge is at once communal and adversar-
ial…these same communities can also become protectors of brand integrity and thus 
critics of the companies that seek to court their allegiance” (Jenkins, 2008) 
Jenkins’s characterization of knowledge communities as adversarial is crucial to this analysis. 
The knowledge community surrounding the Macintosh has always existed in direct contrast to 
the larger and more loosely organized coalition of Windows users. Becoming an active member 
of the Mac community has always meant positioning oneself in opposition to other computing 
platforms. Since Apple has been the only company manufacturing computers running Mac OS 
since Jobs’ return, these users become Apple fans by proxy (Snell, 2020b). Apple has evolved 
from a boutique manufacturer of personal computers to a multinational consumer electronics 
29 
brand under Jobs’ successor Tim Cook. In the process, members of the brand’s knowledge com-
munity have frequently questioned whether the new leadership has adhered to the supposed ide-
als of its previous incarnation.  
According to Jenkins, the amateur productions and interventions fans create in response to 
perceived slights are a form of “collective intelligence.” Jenkins argues that capital structures in 
the west have slowly become more aware of and attuned to the power fans wield through collec-
tive intelligence. This awareness and the actions resulting from it are what he terms “affective 
economics…which seeks to understand the emotional underpinnings of consumer decision-mak-
ing as a driving force behind viewing and purchasing decisions” (Jenkins, 2008).  In Jenkins’ 
framing, the tension between the collective intelligence of fandom and the affective economics 
of content producers and consumer brands are the driving forces of convergence culture. This 
tension is visible between Apple and its Mac user base. The company frequently makes sweep-
ing claims about its hardware products. The users/fans immediately test these claims upon the 
product’s release, reporting their results across forums, podcasts, and YouTube videos. In recent 
years Apple’s fans have also clearly demonstrated an awareness of and skepticism towards the 
company’s emphasis on aesthetic innovation. They frequently contrast this with diminishing in-
creases in compute speed and other performance metrics. 
In Exploiting Fandom, Mel Stanfill argues that the media industry has tilted the power 
structures of digital media in their favor to both contain fan interaction and leverage fan labor as 
a form of cultural capital. “As industry invites fans to participate,” she argues, “it attempts to re-
cruit them into a system of management—a selective and specific system passing itself off as 
neutral and universal” (Stanfill, 2019). This system contains fans by guiding them to interact 
30 
through approved channels, often sharing pre-approved content, to signal their emotional invest-
ment through engagement, recorded and interpreted as demographic data to target future adver-
tising. Stanfill calls this process the “domestication model” of fandom, which “is a bid to accus-
tom fans to eating out of industry’s hand rather than finding their own food.” Those fans whose 
actions aren’t contained through the domestication model are instead encouraged to use their la-
bor in service of the industry’s promotional efforts. Stanfill explains: 
“…promotional labor creates value by distributing industry-made promotional con-
tent, which capitalizes on fans’ access to the means of media distribution for industry’s 
benefit… Some fans do this work to launch or further careers as professional, paid 
workers—a trajectory normalized in representations of fans and industry statements 
about fan production…Thus, career trajectories toward becoming professional media 
workers do not necessarily mitigate the extraction of unpaid labor from other obliga-
tions (including paid labor) to do the often-intensive work of production.”  
This form of aspirational promotional labor is prevalent in the Macintosh user community. The 
rise of podcasting and blogging, which coincided with Jobs’ return and Apple’s early 2000s re-
naissance, led to a groundswell of fan publications that operate at the periphery of the technology 
industry and attempt to curry influence and favor by incessantly reporting on rumors and theories 
about Apple’s upcoming releases. All this labor ends up serving Apple’s interests, creating a tre-
mendous amount of buzz around each product announcement, including minor updates. 
This thesis will adopt a segmented approach to analyzing such fan behavior, adapted from 
Collins et al. (2020), wherein the authors propose a “folksonomy” of fans. This flexible taxon-
omy categorizes fans using specific cultural language within fandom spaces through which fans 
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and brands identify one another. The folksonomy measures activity within three fannish val-
ues/behaviors: knowledge of the brand, social engagement surrounding the brand, and passion 
for the brand’s values/products. Three of the categories outlined by Collins et al. are especially 
common in the Macintosh user community: the Alpha, the Maven and the Evangelist. As previ-
ously discussed, the Brand Evangelist category of fan engagement is codified and encouraged by 
Apple itself. According to Collins et al. (2020): 
“The evangelist tries to get others involved in the product as a specific goal… The 
“Evangelist” has a religious connotation that is integral to its meaning…Apple wanted 
to call their fervent fans evangelists, and the Apple evangelists wanted to be called 
that. As the concept spread more widely, religiosity became an essential part of what 
an evangelist is in a non-religious context.”  
Apple encouraged its fans to identify as evangelists because it enabled a “proselytizing” behav-
ior. Macintosh users extolled the virtues of their chosen operating system over the alternatives, 
especially Microsoft Windows. However, as Apple’s product offerings diversified (with the 
iPod, iPhone, and iPad), the company had less use for this sort of engagement. The proliferation 
of cheaper portable devices based on Apple’s new iOS platform and the company’s increased fo-
cus on lifestyle marketing targeted at broadly influential Alphas (i.e., social media influencers) 
resulted in many Mac fans adopting the stance of the Maven. According to the folksonomy men-
tioned above, a Maven: 
“Sees themselves as an expert in a particular set of matters…. Mavens’ knowledge is 
in the context of other products in the same category…a Maven knows why the specs 
are better for product A versus product B. The Maven’s position is a rational one: he 
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or she supports a product because they are knowledgeable about most products, and 
this one wins out for one reason or another” (Collins et al., 2020) 
After years of defending Apple as an underdog against the perceived onslaught of monopolistic 
competition from Microsoft, these fans turned their energy towards defending the Mac as the 
heart and soul of Apple. During the controversy surrounding the Mac Pro and iMac Pro, such 
mavens frequently deployed arguments about productivity and “real work” as reasons that Apple 
should continue investing in the legacy of the Macintosh. In other words, the very evangelism 
the company had encouraged in the late 1990s and early 2000s encouraged and inspired a 
method of dissent among “Pro” Mac users in the 2010s. 
 Kristina Busse has outlined specific ethical considerations for qualitative research of 
online fandoms, such as the analysis that follows. Her chapter on the subject outlines two pri-
mary concerns: “One is the question whether online evidence ought to be viewed as a textual 
document or as an utterance by the person who wrote it; the other is the question whether a given 
online space, especially on social media sites, is public or private” (Busse, 2018). In addressing 
Busse’s first question, this thesis will attempt to separate textual documents, such as blog posts, 
from extemporaneous utterances, such as those given on podcasts and YouTube videos. This 
separation is commonly remarked upon by fan creators within the Apple fandom as topics from 
blog posts are frequently expanded and subjected to further analysis on the authors’ podcasts 
(Hurley & Snell, 2018).  
Addressing Busse’s concern about the privacy of fandom spaces, this thesis focuses on fan 
content released to blogs, podcasts, and YouTube channels branded as and geared toward com-
mentary about Apple. Many of the creators behind these outlets are published technology jour-
nalists or amateurs aspiring to create independent trade publications. This thesis distinguishes 
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those aspirants from their more established industrial counterparts by separating fans who pur-
chase goods from Apple and reviewers who receive free products to review on a trial basis. The 
distribution of these so-called “review units” is considered a status symbol within the fandom 
and marks a rite of passage from fan status to semi-professional trade journalism (Bonnington, 
2017). As such, sources cited as fans within this thesis were not receiving review units during the 
Mac Pro/iMac Pro controversy (2017-2019) but may have subsequently ascended into the hal-
lowed spreadsheets of Apple’s PR list. 
3.2 Evangelists, Alphas & Mavens 
In September 1983, Guy Kawasaki was hired as the Chief Software Evangelist at Apple. His job 
description directed him to meet with third-party software developers and convince them to bring 
their applications to the nascent Macintosh platform ahead of its global launch in 1984 
(Kawasaki, 1990). He departed the company in 1987 to start his own Mac-based software ven-
ture but returned in 1995 as an Apple Fellow tasked with reinvigorating the company’s fanbase. 
Over the course of his career, Kawasaki has written multiple books about his stints at Apple 
which range from management handbooks to personal memoirs. The earliest of these, The Mac-
intosh Way, was published in 1990 and includes an early definition of Evangelism as it was used 
inside Apple. “Evangelism is sales done right,” he argues, “It is the sharing of your dream with 
the marketplace and the making of history with your customer… When you evangelize people, 
they get infected, carry the torch for you, share your heartbeat, and defend you against your ene-
mies. When you look in their eyes, you see your logo” (Kawasaki, 1990). Kawasaki’s definition 
is adapted by Collins et al. (2020) in their folksonomy of fandom groups where particular em-
phasis is placed upon the Evangelist’s emotional connection to the brand and their oppositional 
positioning towards competitors. 
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The emotional connection of Mac users to Apple, and their hatred for the Microsoft/Intel 
(aka Wintel) consortium of the 1980s and 90s has been documented in numerous academic and 
journalistic publications. However, the most pertinent example to this analysis is the discourse 
surrounding high-end or “Pro” Macintosh systems during the era. During the Mac Clone era, Ap-
ple’s licensed hardware vendors were especially adamant about their technical superiority over 
Wintel and advocated for quasi-militant devotion from the Macintosh faithful. A promotional 
stunt staged by Mac Clone manufacturer Power Computing at the 1996 MacWorld Expo rallied 
Apple fans in military fatigues to ride around the convention center on Humvees handing out fli-
ers displaying the slogan “Let’s Kick Intel’s Ass! We’re fighting back for Mac!” (Snell, 2020c).  
 
Figure 3: Power Computing Flyer from MacWorld Expo 1996 
 (Snell, 2020c) 
Spurred on by Apple’s minority share in the personal computer market during this period, Mac 
fans frequently positioned themselves as a resistance movement facing down a monopolistic 
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force embodied by Wintel. Their emotional calls to arms are clear attempts at evangelizing on 
behalf of Apple and the Macintosh platform. As previously established, Apple’s revenues were 
falling precipitously during this period, and yet the company had not promoted the Mac this ag-
gressively since the 1980s. Thus, fans and third-party vendors advocated for the Mac in a manner 
which presented the purchase of such computers as a revolutionary act. “The fundamental no-
tion” behind such rhetoric, according to Collins et al., “is that the evangelist receives an emo-
tional award for this conversion” of an Intel user to membership in the so-called “Cult of Mac” 
(Collins et al., 2020). 
 The classification of Mac fans as members of a technocratic “cult” emerged in the late 
1980s and has become a term of both prideful boasting and mocking derision during various 
points in Apple’s history. Kawasaki identifies the Cult in his 1990 book as “a small part of 
emerging markets…[made up of] hardcore power users and afficionados, plus a small percentage 
of luminaries, analysts, press and dealers” (Kawasaki, 1990).  
 
Figure 4: Cult of Mac Diagram 
(Kawasaki, 1990) 
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Fifteen years later, during the iMac fueled renaissance following the return of Steve Jobs, Belk & 
Tumbat initiated an academic discourse around the Cult of Mac, arguing that its adherents ob-
served practices more in line with a religious tradition than a sports fandom. They explain that  
“This religion is based on an origin myth for Apple Computer, heroic and savior leg-
ends surrounding its co-founder and current CEO Steve Jobs the devout faith of its 
follower congregation, their belief in the righteousness of the Macintosh, the existence 
of one or more Satanic opponents, Mac believers proselytizing and converting non-
believers, and the hope among cult members that salvation can be achieved by trans-
cending corporate capitalism…” (Belk & Tumbat, 2005) 
Their emphasis on the emotional connection of “Cult” members to the Apple brand clearly aligns 
these individuals with the Evangelist model outlined by Kawasaki and Collins et al. The framing 
of loyalty to and support of the Macintosh as both an opposition to the “satanic” forces of Wintel 
and a potentially transcendent form of capitalist engagement is key. By supporting the Mac, they 
argue, fans considered themselves to be literally buying into a future of computing which more 
closely aligned with libertarian and countercultural values that ran counter to the corporatized 
interests of Apple’s primary competitors. This clearly appealed to adherents of the California 
Ideology, as outlined by Marwick, wherein “the adoption of computer technologies brings posi-
tive social consequence” (Marwick, 2013).  
 The Mac/Wintel rivalry became less central to the belief system of the Cult of Mac dur-
ing the late 2000s when Apple announced that it would transition its entire Macintosh product 
line to Intel processors. The transition signaled both the failure of Apple’s reliance on the out-
moded PowerPC processor standard and the end of an era of Mac specificity. In fact, shortly af-
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ter the launch of Intel-based Macs the company began bundling all off their computers with driv-
ers enabling them to run Microsoft Windows (Apple, Inc., 2006). Apple’s launch of the iPhone 
in 2007 has overshadowed the rancor of this transition in many histories of the era, and rightly 
so, as it launched Apple’s earning to stratospheric levels and made it the most valuable company 
on Earth. However, the Intel transition also marked the beginning of an era of wavering discom-
fort among Mac users which culminated in the iMac Pro controversy. Some of these fans went so 
far as to argue that less frequent updates and declining sales relative to the iPhone meant that Ap-
ple and Tim Cook did not care about the Mac platform. These complaints, according to Matt 
Hills’ theory of “Always on Fandom,” become an articulation of the individual fan’s self-identity 
world and the external system of communally shared constructions which makes up their fan-
dom. The concerns and complaints outlined below articulated an identity for “Pro” Mac users in 
an increasingly iOS focused technology landscape and initiated a chain of events which led to 
the Mac Roundtable and the announcement of the 2019 Mac Pro.  
 Earlier in the 2000s however, with the launch of the iPod and later the iPhone, Apple be-
gan to shift its emphasis away from the Mac and towards portable products. These new product 
launches were accompanied by an emphasis on “Lifestyle Marketing,” which Jung & Merlin 
(2003) define as “a product or service that provides consumers with an emotional attachment to 
an identifiable lifestyle — the rugged outdoorsman, the posh executive or an urban hipster, for 
example.” Advertising campaigns from the period emphasized these aspirational lifestyles, such 
as a TV spot depicting models accessorizing their iPod Shuffle with various outfits signifying 
youth subcultures (Cheng, 2016). And then there was the ubiquitous silhouette campaign which 
featured the black outlines of fashionably dressed dancers with white iPod earbuds in their ears 
against brightly colored backdrops.   
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Figure 5: Stills from iPod Shuffle TV Spot 
(Cheng, 2016) 
The most literal and visible representations Apple created for its intended audience during this 
era was the portrayal of a “Mac” by actor Justin Long in the “Get A Mac” campaign. In his anal-
ysis of the campaign Randal Livingstone finds that Apple “defines for its audience the dichot-
omy between the casual, confident, creative Mac user and the formal, frustrated, fun-deprived 
PC user” (Livingstone, 2011b).  
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Figure 6: Still from the “Get A Mac” Campaign 
Note: John Hodgman (left) portrayed the “PC” to Justin Long’s (right) “Mac” in the 
American TV spots for the “Get a Mac” campaign (Livingstone, 2011a). 
Livingstone is particularly interested in the implied classes of PC and Mac users that are present 
within this campaign. He places “Mac” in the upper class, because Long’s depiction of “a self-
directed, flexible lifestyle is commonly riddled with risk, instability, and hyper individuality, 
characteristics of post industrialism that are often left out of the ‘digital’” (Livingstone, 2011b). 
This aspirational class narrative reinforces Marwick’s findings about the conspicuous consump-
tion of Apple hardware by social media industry workers and Ross’s depiction of the No-Collar 
Worker whose precarity is papered over with aspiration and so-called “hustle.” The ideal Mac 
40 
user then, according to Apple, is an aspirational Alpha. As Collins et al. (2020) explain “The cur-
rency of the alpha is popularity. Why the Alpha attaches to one brand or another is immaterial; 
the attachment could be based on passion, or reason or both…what is essential is their role as an 
opinion leader.”  
 In his chapter on “Audiencing,” John Fiske (1992) argues that “a text is no more nor no 
less an effect of the audience than is the audience of the text.” In his systemic view of reception 
studies, producers design their texts around existing social categories which are in turn re-formed 
and reinforced by the consumption of said text. A social category within this system, he explains 
is “formed and dissolved more fluidly according to [their] textual conditions. It is identified by 
what its members do rather than by what they are…” (Fiske, 1992). In this sense, Apple’s audi-
ence of “Pro” Mac users were largely defined by their purchasing of “Pro” hardware rather than 
any identifiably “professional” title or job description they may have possessed. The company 
reinforced this by broadening the use cases presented for these products during demonstrations, 
while at the same time targeting industries where they had a strong sales record (i.e., the creative 
professions). This points to Stanfill’s argument in Exploiting Fandom, that “As industry invites 
fans to participate, it attempts to recruit them into a system of management—a selective and spe-
cific system passing itself off as neutral and universal” (Stanfill, 2019). When Tim Cook stood 
on stage at press events and told fans that “We can’t wait to see what you do with it,” he also im-
plicitly told them that the product(s) Apple shipped were fully formed and feature complete. The 
pro user was invited to create using these tools, but had no input on the creation, maintenance or 
updating of the tool itself. 
 This framing functioned well for Apple in the 2000’s and early 2010’s, but as Intel’s sup-
ply chain issues began constraining their ability to update higher end Mac systems such as the 
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Mac Pro fans began to operate outside of the company’s preferred construction. With the shift to 
Intel, the Mac became largely indistinguishable from its Windows-based competitors in terms of 
internal components. Apple was forced to compete largely on the fronts of industrial design, op-
erating system functionality and its nascent suite of cross-platform software operating on both 
the Mac and iOS (the operating system which ran on iPhones and iPads). Without the vitriolic 
vendetta to wage against Wintel, many longtime Mac users moved across the fan folksonomy 
form the role of the Evangelist into the position of the Maven. To reiterate, a Maven is “someone 
who sees themselves as an expert in a particular set of matters [where] A geek knows all the 
specs of a product; a Maven knows why the specs are better for product A versus product B” 
(Collins et al., 2020). Losing the evangelistic passion of defending the Mac and Apple against 
Intel, particularly after Apple became the largest company in the world by market cap in 2018 
(Salinas, 2018), fundamentally changed the Mac fandom and Apple’s expectations of them. 
However, as will be demonstrated below, when Apple began to delay products and drift away 
from its Four Quadrants strategy that lingering evangelistic sentiment morphed into an organized 
outrage against the company. 
3.3 Accidental Tech Podcast & The Mac Malaise 
Initially launched as a car enthusiast program in 2013, the Accidental Tech Podcast emerged or-
ganically, as its name suggests, from conversations between co-hosts and professional software 
developers Marco Arment, Casey Liss and John Siracusa. Of the three, only Siracusa had any ex-
perience as a technology analyst, having authored a column for the technology blog Ars Tech-
nica in the 2000’s and 2010’s (Wells, 2019). Arment had previously served as the Chief Tech-
nical Officer for the micro-blogging site Tumblr while Liss and Siracusa had worked in enter-
prise software development (Arment, n.d.; Liss, n.d.; Wells, 2019). Despite their professional 
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roles within adjacent industries, the trio approached their discussions of Apple from the perspec-
tive of fannish mavens. They frequently dissected press releases, keynote presentations and 
leaked rumors with the same fervor as members of forum sites such as MacRumors. Other pod-
casts lauded their expertise when it came to analyzing the technical minutia of new Mac hard-
ware and Intel processor revisions. During the first six years of the podcast’s run the company 
treated it like any other fan publication. Executives occasionally made coy references to the trio 
in their presentations and Apple employees funneled rumors to the show to fuel conversation. 
However, as the “Trash Can” Mac Pro began to show its age the hosts took on a much more 
emotional and critical approach to Apple which ultimately brought them more notoriety and pro-
fessional recognition from the community and the company. 
 One of the earliest discussions to feature an emotional outburst on behalf Mac users, #179: 
Free to Play Dogs, was published in July 2016 shortly after the MacRumors.com Buyer’s Guide 
was updated to show that the Mac Pro had not been updated in over 1,000 days. Marco Arment 
was particularly outraged by this lack of action on Apple’s part, saying that: 
“When they choose to just say, ‘You know, it's not worth updating to this.’ That is 
really a position of hubris and of arrogance and neglect of these products… That is 
infuriating. And it really shows a level of disdain for your customers. It takes a certain 
degree of shamelessness, and of arrogance and hubris, to be still selling the same Mac 
Pro today, if you walk into the Apple Store…you could order in December of 2013” 
(Arment et al., 2016a).  
Arment’s invocation of hubris, arrogance, and disdain on the part of Apple along with his admis-
sion of emotional agitation at the situation demonstrates his position within the fandom. Despite 
the company’s attempts at nurturing a fanbase of Alphas and Mavens, a high-profile fan and core 
43 
member of the Cult of Mac, associated with both a major social networking service and a popu-
lar podcast, was openly aiming his evangelistic ire at the mothership in Cupertino.  
Arment went on to cite recent interviews and press videos in which Apple CEO Tim Cook 
was shown to conduct his daily work on an iPad Pro. “…It looks like Tim Cook just doesn't like 
the Mac very much,” Arment said, adding “I hope that's not the reason for all this. And I hope 
that's not true. But that's how it looks. It looks like Tim Cook doesn't care about the Mac” 
(Arment et al., 2016a). This projection of apathy onto Tim Cook played into the common refrain 
that Apple had suffered under his leadership and that he had failed to sufficiently devote himself 
to the cult of Steve Jobs. Arment evoked Jobs on various podcast episodes during this period as a 
means of criticizing Cook’s Apple and their perceived malaise around the Mac. In one episode 
he noted that “Steve Jobs loved computers. And even when new stuff [such as iPads and 
iPhones] came out, he loved computers…But it is very, very clear that the Mac is not being 
given the priority and resources that it needs to move forward” (Arment et al., 2016c). Rather 
than admit, as his co-hosts reluctantly managed to, that the Macintosh platform might simply be 
losing its popularity and market share to Apple’s portable devices, Arment invoked Steve Jobs’ 
dedication to the platform as a symbolic counterexample to the apathetic neglect he perceived 
under Tim Cook. 
Later that same year, Arment appealed to Apple and its employees through a blog post enti-
tled “A World Without the Mac Pro,” which he opened as follows: “It’s looking increasingly 
likely that there will never be another Mac Pro. Here’s why that would be a shame…” (Arment, 
2016). From there he lays out a case for the continuation of the product line that covers every-
thing from technical specifications of competing desktop computers to flattery of Apple’s hard-
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ware design team and the stubborn insistence of Mac loyalists to stick to the platform. In the lat-
ter section, he writes that “We don’t want to leave the Mac. We came here, built here, and stayed 
here all of this time because Macs are truly awesome computers, and macOS is the best operating 
system in the world” (Arment, 2016). His insistence that the Mac and its operating system are 
fundamentally superior to the alternatives presented by competitors echoes the evangelism com-
mon among Mac fans during the 1990s. However, in this case it is tinged with a sense of desper-
ation. Arment is practically begging Apple to justify his decades long faith in their product offer-
ings. “If we’re forced to move to something else,” he writes, “it’ll be painfully, inescapably, per-
petually worse… don’t abandon those of us who truly want or need the best computers in the 
world, because if they’re not Macs, they’re not good enough” (Arment, 2016). 
Arment’s emotional appeals were echoed by his ATP co-host John Siracusa, who throughout 
this period was desperately clinging to a 2009 Mac Pro in an act of resistance against the com-
pany’s controversial “Trash Can” re-design. Siracusa’s insistence on maintaining a computer 
which was approaching a decade of continuous daily use brought on considerable mockery from 
fellow fans and podcasters (Gruber, 2016), but his appeals were in some ways even more evan-
gelistic than those made by his colleagues. When Apple quietly discontinued the standalone dis-
play frequently paired with the Mac Pro, Siracusa experienced what he called a “dark night of 
the soul,” in which he lay awake reckoning with the possible end of Apple’s investment in the 
desktop PC market. He outlined the cause of his distress on the Accidental Tech Podcast, saying  
“It crushed me to the point where I was immediately trying to consider if they come 
out with another Mac Pro, I don't think I'm gonna buy one. I should just get an iMac I 
cannot live in a world where I gonna wait until June next year to get a new Mac Pro. 
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And then connect an ugly third party…monitor to it. I don't know if I can do it... this 
monitor thing has totally destroyed me” (Arment et al., 2016b) 
For a dedicated Apple fan and sometime columnist to lay awake and emotionally reckon with 
abandoning his beloved computer platform speaks to the melodrama experienced by Mac fans 
during this period. Siracusa went on to describe the phenomenon as “Mac Malaise,” saying that 
“every publication feels like they need to have a ‘Mac Malaise’ article where they talk about ei-
ther cranky Mac users or Apple failing those Mac users, or both” (Arment et al., 2016c). Articles 
and podcasts from around this time echoed Siracusa’s hopelessness, with headlines such as “Pro-
fessional Mac Users' Complaints List Grows After 'Disappointing' Apple Event” (Hardwick, 
2016) and “Why 2016 is such a terrible year for the Mac” (Snell, 2016). Such malaise around the 
Mac was clearly not the response Apple had hoped for as they rolled out significant updates to 
higher selling product lines like the iPhone and iPad during the Fall of 2016. Their lack of new 
products and a coherent message on the Mac in general, and the Mac Pro in particular, gave fans 
and industry pundits the space to define the narrative and craft a discourse that was dominated by 
negativity. 
 The hosts of the Accidental Tech Podcast weren’t just complaining about their current 
circumstances though. They spent months debating potential paths forward for the Mac Pro. 
These debates were contentious largely because they revolved around questions about the value 
of labor and which professions could be categorically grouped together and considered worthy of 
a “Pro” computer. According to Arment, “you can't whip out pro use cases selectively to justify 
certain things which Apple does,” he advocated for a “truly Pro” computer which would be de-
lineated from the consumer Mac models by its intended audience and its technical specifications 
(Arment et al., 2016b). Such conversations frequently devolved into judgmental evaluations of 
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common professions in the Mac fandom such as software development, video editing and pho-
tography. These evaluations were then appended with the opinions of the various hosts as to 
whether they considered these forms of labor “professional” and if they believed Apple felt the 
same way. At one point, Casey Liss brought these terms into stark relief, stating that “I am by at 
least some definition. A professional. I'm not a photographer, that's a different kind of profes-
sional. I'm not an artist, that's a different kind of professional, but I am a professional, no ques-
tion” (Arment et al., 2016a). 
Liss argued that  Apple “…can define professionals as professional podcasters, as profes-
sional project managers, as CMO's, whatever…” (Arment et al., 2016b). For him, the only re-
quirement was that a Mac Pro serve an audience with more computationally taxing workloads 
than those of the “consumer”. He explained this by comparing his work as a software developer 
to the creative professions: 
“I write code for a living. That's what I do. By most definitions, that is a Pro-level 
profession, in whatever definition of “Pro” you so choose…suppose I'm a professional 
photographer, and I want to have this machine in the field that can do, I don't know, 
whatever professional photographer people do, like plug in SD cards and, do compu-
tationally difficult things, or, you know, have a bazillion pictures open at once, which 
somehow necessitates 32 gigs of RAM…if this isn't for you? Well, there's no real Mac 
Pro option. The iMac is below me because I'm a professional” (Arment et al., 2016b). 
The last sentence of Liss’ statement is particularly important. By positioning the Mac Pro as 
“above” the consumer-focused iMac he was reinforcing the Four Quadrants theory espoused by 
Steve Jobs 17 years earlier. It is also notable that he considers his own work to be “by most defi-
nitions a pro-level profession.” In his construction, the “Pro” in “Mac Pro” is as much about the 
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role it plays in the “Pro-ness” of supposedly professional labor as it is an assessment of computa-
tional power. The construction of professionalism as a hierarchical dichotomy, positioning some 
users above others based solely on the complexity of their hardware needs, echoes Marwick’s 
findings about status in Silicon Valley and Ross’ ethnographic research at No Collar workplaces 
in the 2000s. In these settings, and within the Apple fandom, technically complex work is valued 
over labor that is more focused on interpersonal, or soft, skills. By owning a Mac Pro then, a user 
is positioning themselves at the top of this status hierarchy, implicitly asserting that their labor is 
more complex and thus more valuable. 
 John Siracusa and Marco Arment were particularly concerned that Apple might be aban-
doning these “high end” users in favor of the admittedly larger market segment which purchased 
their consumer products. They recommended an informal survey of other “professionals” across 
affected industries and how such anecdotal data might aid in their understanding of Apple’s mar-
ket share and impact on labor. Siracusa explained that this survey could be conducted simply by 
evaluating one’s peers: 
“If you find yourself saying, “Look, everybody who's editing videos is doing it on a 
big, powerful personal computer. Personal computers can't go away, I'm a video edi-
tor…” Then [it’s easy to] make the leap to “therefore Apple needs to make a new Mac 
Pro,” [rather than] … “Does Apple need to make Mac Pro, or do you just need to 
switch to Windows and be sad?” Maybe Apple staying in that business is just some 
sentimental thing that you care about” (Arment et al., 2016a) 
Siracusa even admitted that he may be approaching the issue with too much sentimentality, stat-
ing that rather than leave its highest end computers stagnant for years, “we would all be much 
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happier if Apple got out of it and stop making the line of computers entirely…and gave that busi-
ness to Microsoft or some company that's actually interested in pursuing it” (Arment et al., 
2016a). In a fan culture known for its evangelistic passion, this admission might have previously 
been considered a mortal sin. However, it is a testament to the overwhelming nature of “Mac 
Malaise” that Siracusa’s concession to Microsoft went largely unremarked upon and was in fact 
echoed in industry columnists’ praise of Microsoft’s Surface product line during this period. 
 None of the hosts of Accidental Tech Podcast were willing to fully give up on a future 
Mac Pro though. Instead, they argued for Apple to reboot the product line with a machine that 
more closely resembled the 2006-2012 “cheese grater” design. This computer, shaped more like 
a traditional PC tower, allowed the user to easily swap out components after purchase thus ex-
tending the life of the machine by adding newer and faster parts. Such arguments were not new 
in the Apple fanbase or the technology community at large during this period. Advocates for 
consumers’ so-called “Right to Repair” had been pushing against Apple for their penchant to-
wards sealing up their products in a manner that made component upgrades next to impossible. 
Marco Arment argued that any future Mac Pro would “have to be upgradeable aftermarket, pe-
riod…And if for some reason, you really insist on making them not upgradable, you have to be 
updating them on a regular basis, every nine to 12 months…because that's what's competitive” 
(Arment et al., 2016a). As Chun (2016) has noted, new media are “new to the extent that they are 
updated…Things no longer updated are things no longer used, useable, or cared for.” Mac fans 
felt justifiably frustrated by the lack of updates to the Mac Pro, particularly after Apple fore-
closed on any possibility of aftermarket updates undertaken by the consumer. Despite all these 
concerns and frustrations, fans eagerly awaited a new Mac Pro.  
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John Siracusa, with his 12-year-old “Cheese Grater” Mac Pro, became a symbol of the in-
creasingly impatient “Pro” user demanding an update from Apple. He closed out a particularly 
contentious segment on the topic as follows:  
“It's frustrating when at any price. You can't throw your money at Apple and say, “Just 
give me as much RAM as will physically fit in the machine…I don't care how much 
it costs” and they’re like “No, we’re not interested in selling you that.” And you should 
be, because it's a good way to make money off suckers like us! …I wish they would 
have enough interest to say, “Can we fleece those people?” Because at this point, 
like, I'm begging to be fleeced…” (Arment et al., 2016b) 
Across the Apple fandom, similar pleas were made throughout 2015 and 2016 with increasing 
urgency as Intel continued to fall behind on its manufacturing timelines and the “days since last 
update” counter on the MacRumors buyers guide kept climbing. Apple released an update to the 
MacBook Pro in the fall of 2016 which only stoked the outrage surrounding their desktop prod-
ucts. More podcast segments and blog posts accumulated during late 2016 documenting the Mac 
Malaise. This culminated in a column by Apple analyst Mark Gurman in Bloomberg entitled 
“How Apple Alienated Mac Loyalists,” in which he wrote that “To die-hard fans, Apple Inc.'s 
Macintosh sometimes seems like an afterthought these days” (Gurman, 2017). The negative PR 
generated by the Mac Pro had moved from the fandom to the financial papers, and Apple would 
have to begin taking it seriously or start facing questions from shareholders.  
 Fans such as the co-hosts of the Accidental Tech Podcast leveraged their emotional con-
nection to the Apple Brand to advocate angrily on behalf of a product line they felt was being ne-
glected. The success of their campaign can be ascribed to Apple’s active encouragement of such 
emotional connection through its formal and informal evangelism campaigns throughout the 
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1990s. Apple attempted to contain this manner of fan engagement during its shift towards an au-
dience of more casual computer users interested in lifestyle products such as the iPod in the 
2000s. However, these fans resurfaced when the momentum the company had built up during the 
Mac’s Intel transition ground to a halt. The community of fan produced podcasts and blogs 
which had been the backbone of the Mac community for decades quickly became an echo cham-
ber for the growing Mac Malaise. These angry evangelists were still ready and willing to wage 
war against Windows but felt that their corporate leaders had left them behind in favor of a more 
status-focused alpha consumer. When the bad publicity surrounding this debate bubbled up 
above the surface of fandom and began to enter the business press the company had to make an 
announcement to reassure both its “Pro” users and its shareholders (Gurman, 2017). Thus, in 
2017 they convened the Mac Roundtable and uncharacteristically pre-announced two new pieces 
of high-end hardware.   
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4 SERIOUSLY BAD-ASS; INDUSTRIAL ANALYSIS OF THE MAC BOOK PRO 
This section will analyze a rare moment of publicly acknowledged shifts within Apple's produc-
tion culture surrounding the announcement and subsequent discontinuation of their iMac Pro line 
of desktop computers. Released in 2017, the all-in-one iMac Pro was almost immediately up-
staged by a redesigned modular tower-style Mac Pro, which was announced around the same 
time but released in 2019. In early 2021, Apple discontinued the iMac Pro and sold off their re-
maining inventory ahead of further revisions to the consumer iMac and the Mac Pro (Simon, 
2021). Apple’s internal culture of secrecy combined with a misunderstanding of the “pro” cus-
tomer’s expectations resulted in the iMac Pro’s immediate overshadowing and early discontinua-
tion. The section will argue that this resulted from a misjudgment of the impact of industrial lore 
on fandom by executive leadership within Apple’s product design and marketing teams. Apple’s 
fans expected the company to follow the Four Quadrant product model designed by the late 
Steve Jobs. However, the company’s focus on lifestyle marketing and pursuit of aspirational 
prosumers led them to develop and release a product based upon an over-simplified understand-
ing of the professional desktop workstation market segment. By the time Apple executives real-
ized the error in their thinking, it was entirely too late. They were forced to announce plans for a 
future Mac Pro two months before their public reveal of the iMac Pro, thus dooming the device 
to be permanently overshadowed by an even more “pro” model. This section will analyze the 
launch of both products, including their initial press materials and sanctioned reviews, to estab-
lish their intended audiences. The launch of the 2019 Mac Pro will then be presented as Apple’s 
mea culpa to professional users and a return to a definition of “professional” that was more fa-
miliar to the company’s most ardent fans and consumers from a prior era of desktop computing. 
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4.1 The iMac Pro 
One of the most influential web pages among fans and devoted users of Apple technology prod-
ucts is the MacRumors “Buyer’s Guide.” This page displays all the company’s current product 
offerings alongside traffic-light style buttons indicating whether they are considered a good value 
for their purchase price at any given time. For most of 2016, the Mac section of this webpage 
was the center of a growing controversy among Apple fans and customers. On an episode of the 
Accidental Tech Podcast, tech columnist and software developer John Siracusa posited that it 
was “exactly the opposite message that Apple wants anywhere, all of its products arrayed in a 
big line with red things that say ‘don’t buy’” (Arment et al., 2016a). Siracusa and his colleagues 
were growing increasingly impatient with Apple’s apparent lack of concern for their high-end 
desktop, the black cylindrical tower known as the Mac Pro, which was approaching 1,000 days 
since its last hardware revision. This machine, derisively nicknamed “the trash can,” was still 
selling for nearly $3,000 despite containing three-year-old components. 
As critical takes on the long-dormant Mac Pro amassed from podcast hosts, journalists, 
and high-profile developers, Apple realized that they would need to address the controversy. 
However, this negative press accumulated mere months before the company planned to launch a 
new high-end all-in-one desktop, the iMac Pro, at their Worldwide Developer Conference in 
June 2017. It was presumably too late in the product’s development for any significant changes. 
To avoid stoking the growing outrage by replacing the Mac Pro with this new iMac Pro, as they 
had initially intended, Apple was forced to pre-announce both the new all-in-one and a mysteri-
ous “modular” pro tower during an unprecedented press event in April 2017. This so-called 
“roundtable event” was held in a Mac testing facility inside its notoriously locked-down corpo-
rate headquarters. A handful of prominent tech journalists were seated at a table with a group of 
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Apple executives who effectively pre-announced both the all-in-one iMac Pro and a mythical 
“modular” pro desktop machine, to be released “after this year” (Panzarino & Dillet, 2017). The 
event sparked a whole new wave of speculation among fans and pundits, wherein confused ob-
servers wondered about the intended customers for the two “Pro” machines. When Apple for-
mally revealed the iMac Pro in June, some journalists went as far as calling the device “a trap” 
(Brownlee, 2017a) based on the company’s pre-mature revelation existence of a modular Mac 
Pro replacement that would presumably outperform this new all-in-one desktop computer. 
Following this metaphor of the iMac Pro as a “trap,” it is instructive to analyze the dis-
course surrounding the device to determine which customers were being baited. During the 
roundtable event, Apple’s SVP of Worldwide Marketing, Phil Schiller, admitted that “there isn’t 
one prototypical pro customer.” The iMac Pro targeted a specific subset of knowledge workers 
with heavier computational demands than the typical iMac could handle. Apple’s controversial 
decision to eschew a standard professional-grade desktop computer’s modularity for a familiar 
all-in-one design signals that the company was attempting to redefine its highest-end market seg-
ment. This redefinition was doomed to fail, as the company admitted by pre-announcing the 
“modular” Mac Pro during the 2017 roundtable and eventually discontinuing the iMac Pro, with-
out a single hardware revision, in the spring of 2021. I argue that the iMac Pro attempts to com-
municate professionalism as an aesthetic through its familiar all-in-one form factor and an exclu-
sive black and grey color scheme. This aesthetic addressed a segment of the desktop computer 
market interested in a high-end desktop computer that operated as a status symbol and an aes-
thetic object rather than a purely practical device. This analysis relies upon official statements 
from Apple executives, marketing materials released alongside the iMac Pro, and a unique PR 
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strategy that saw Apple focusing most of its energy on creative professionals, especially YouTu-
bers. 
As previously mentioned, Apple confirmed the iMac Pro existence during their April 2017 
roundtable event, just two months before it was formally introduced at the Worldwide Developer 
Conference and eight months before it finally went on sale in December 2017. This sort of pre-
emptive announcement and months-long delay in shipping is extremely rare for Apple, renowned 
for their secrecy regarding new product launches. Thus, it is instructive to examine the evolution 
of the iMac Pro discourse in three phases: the initial confirmation, the official announcement, 
and the final release. Each phase illustrates a different aspect of Apple’s ideal “pro” consumer 
and the corresponding errors in these assumptions, which resulted in the iMac Pro being discon-
tinued as an anomalous one-off release. 
The first phase of the discourse, which emerged from the roundtable event, positioned the 
iMac Pro as an exciting new release for those ‘pros’ who were already using consumer iMacs. 
Towards the beginning of the roundtable event, Phil Schiller provided some unsourced statistics 
about Mac hardware sales, including that the ratio of the notebook to desktop sales was 80/20 
and that about 15% of all Mac customers “use what you’d categorize as a professional applica-
tion on a weekly or even multiple-times-a-week basis” (Panzarino & Dillet, 2017). According to 
Schiller, these users of unspecified “professional applications” are categorical ‘pro’ consumers. 
Among them, “Notebooks are by far and away our most popular systems. Second on the list is 
iMacs…Mac Pro is actually a small percentage of our CPUs — just a single-digit percent” 
(Panzarino & Dillet, 2017). Apple felt that the successful iMac form factor could be adapted to 
suit a large cross-section of the pro-market, as Craig Federighi argued later in the event: 
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“And now you look at today’s 5k iMac… it’s incredibly powerful and a huge fraction 
of what would’ve traditionally required the Mac Pros of old and are being well ad-
dressed by iMac — whether it's audio editing, video editing, graphics, arts, and so 
forth. But there’s still even further we can take iMac as a high performance, pro sys-
tem, and we think that form factor can address even more of the pro-market…so many 
of our customers were moving to iMac that we saw a path to address many, many more 
of those that were finding themselves limited by Mac Pro through a next-generation 
iMac. And really put a lot of our energy behind that.” (Panzarino & Dillet, 2017) 
Federighi seems to be arguing that the iMac’s second place ranking in terms of sales is an en-
dorsement of the product’s form factor rather than an indictment of the infrequently updated Mac 
Pro. He briefly mentioned that Pros were “moving to iMac,” but only to justify the company’s 
decision to double down on the all-in-one form factor rather than the modular tower design of the 
Mac Pro line. In fact, from the roundtable phase onward, discourse from Apple about the virtues 
of the iMac Pro always promoted it as an iteration on the all-in-one Pro’s knew and loved from 
the 27-inch 5k iMac. This resonates with Eisenman’s theory of the “dominant design,” wherein 
Apple assumed that the all-in-one was the natural conclusion of desktop PC design. Many Pros 
begged to differ, siding with Schaefer & Durham, arguing that the all-in-one elided the technical 
specificity of the machine and prevented the customization afforded by modular tower-based de-
signs like those of the previous Mac Pros. 
The emphasis on workers in the creative professions during the roundtable is equally illu-
minating and was one of the constant elements of the iMac Pro discourse. These are profession-
als whose work is grounded in aesthetics and thus Apple assumed they could be enticed by the 
“beautiful simplicity” of the iMac’s all-in-one form factor. The iMac’s built-in 5k display was an 
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initial justification for targeting these pros, as their visual needs would be ill-suited by an exter-
nal display that would be a necessary accessory to the Mac Pro. However, by the end of John 
Ternus’s presentation revealing the iMac Pro at the Worldwide Developer Conference, the dis-
play was a secondary concern. 
4.2 iMac Pro Press Kit Analysis 
Like all of Apple’s flagship products since the mid-2000s, the iMac Pro was unveiled to the 
world with a dramatic video clip shown during a live presentation by one of the company’s exec-
utives. In this case, Senior Vice President of Hardware Engineering John Ternus did the honors, 
unveiling the iMac Pro reveal video during his segment on new Mac hardware at the 2017 
Worldwide Developer Conference. The video shows the iMac Pro emerging from a sea of fea-
tureless grey shadow, with its sharp edges and black input devices delineated the device against 
an otherwise endless void.  
 
Figure 7: Still from iMac Pro Reveal Video 
(Apple — WWDC 2017 Keynote, 2017) 
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A distorted blues guitar riffs over computer-generated fly-bys of an iMac Pro floating in a fea-
tureless grey expanse without a desk or even a power cable attached. A frontal view of the iMac 
Pro pans around to the side, emphasizing the machine’s thin all-in-one chassis as the word 
“iMac” fades in on the left side of the device and “Pro” abruptly materializes to the right coincid-
ing with a bass drop in the soundtrack. This short video's monochrome grey color palette is only 
interrupted by the blue background displayed on the iMac Pro’s monitor. This serves to empha-
size the machine’s sleek all-in-one form factor and separate it from the familiar Apple promo 
film series through its darker hues. The video’s abundance of (Space) Grey is a bold contrast to 
the company’s traditional all-white aesthetic. That contrast is driven home by the appearance of 
the white text following Apple’s typical visual branding, though off-centered by the machine un-
til the conspicuous arrival of the term “Pro.” In this way, Apple communicates that its newest 
iMac is not like the ones that came before; it is darker and more dramatic, it is for “profession-
als.” 
The San Jose Convention Center audience whooped and cheered as the lights faded up and 
revealed Ternus on-stage in front of an overhead still image of the grey computer, again with no 
wires attached, and its black keyboard and mouse. He begins describing the computer as follows: 
“The first thing you’ll notice is it features the same great design as our 27-inch iMac, 
but it’s in this seriously bad-ass space grey finish. And with that stunning new color 
and gorgeous 5k display, this is without a doubt the most beautiful iMac we’ve ever 
made” (Apple — WWDC 2017 Keynote, 2017) 
Framing the iMac Pro as noticeably familiar yet markedly different directly appeals to the de-
voted Apple fandom and customer base. As Eisenman notes, the minor change in color from sil-
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ver to Apple’s elusive Space Grey creates a “coffee shop effect” where devoted users of the com-
pany’s products can instantly recognize the new “pro” model from across a crowded room. Fur-
thermore, while it is unlikely that anyone is carrying their 21.5-pound iMac Pro to a coffee shop, 
the computer’s darker color scheme would be visible in an open floor plan office amongst a sea 
of lighter silver “consumer” iMacs. Ternus seems to be very aware of this effect, as he breaks 
with Apple’s typically staid corporate manner of public speaking to call the new finish “seriously 
bad-ass” and relishes in an extended applause break from the audience before continuing his 
presentation. Apple CEO Tim Cook also dropped his typically innocent demeanor to echo Ter-
nus’ claim later in the presentation, playing off the “bad-ass” comment as if it were an ad-lib.  
Whether scripted or not, Ternus’ opening salvo about the iMac Pro looking bad ass be-
came the defining structure for a discourse on the serious aesthetic of the device in the days fol-
lowing the presentation. Many tech journalists facetiously quoted Ternus’s remark. They de-
scribed the new finish as “sinister” (Coldeway, 2017) and “hot” (Arment et al., 2017), even com-
paring its aesthetic to that of the Star Wars antagonist Darth Vader (Hackett et al., 6/6/17). In 
press releases issued after the announcement and eventual release of the iMac Pro, Apple refers 
to the computer as having a “gorgeous 27-inch Retina 5k display”, “a stunning new space grey 
enclosure,” and “the same amazingly quiet, thin and seamless aluminum and glass enclosure cus-
tomers know and love” (Apple, Inc., 2017a, 2017b). On the Apple analysis podcast Connected, 
co-host Myke Hurley went so far as to say that users’ inability to replace internal components of 
the machine is aesthetically reinforced because “I feel like if you put your hand in, it would bite 
you” (Hackett et al., 6/6/17). These aggressive, villainous, and at times overly masculine adjec-
tives used to describe the iMac Pro’s appearance reinforced the idea that professional hardware 
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came with an associated aesthetic seriousness absent in the silver iMacs that many “Pros” had 
admittedly been using for years prior.  
The iMac Pro’s darker color created a visible status hierarchy among users overnight. 
Many fans and pundits lamented that the new finish and corresponding black accessories were 
exclusive to the $5,000 “Pro” model (Arment et al., 2017; Statt, 2017). When the iMac Pro fi-
nally began shipping in December 2017, an inflated resale market emerged for the computer’s 
special edition black peripherals (Potuck, 2017). Apple did eventually start selling these highly 
sought-after variants of their mouse, keyboard, and trackpad separately. However, to maintain 
the hierarchical nature of the professional aesthetic, Apple sold each of these new “Space Grey” 
accessories for $20 more than their silver counterparts (Dunn, 2018). This so-called “black tax” 
was not new for Apple. The company had previously released a black version of their flagship 
laptop, the MacBook Pro, that cost $200 more than its similarly configured white counterpart 
(Hackett, 2015). However, with the iMac Pro, Apple combined higher performance and a limited 
colorway with the product marketing hierarchy of the Four Quadrants to create an even costlier 
form of exclusivity. Under this line of thinking, only the most dedicated fans or the most de-
manding users would “invest” in an iMac Pro rather than a consumer iMac, and the black chassis 
would be their reward. 
4.3 iMac Pro Review Process Analysis 
Apple’s pre-emptive announcement of the iMac Pro was not the only unique feature of its 
rollout. This computer also launched with a unique PR strategy, wherein Apple seeded review 
units to prominent YouTubers eschewing the traditional technology journalists they usually 
courted. Instead, those pundits from sites like The Verge, Daring Fireball, TechCrunch, and Six 
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Colors were invited to a brownstone in New York City where Apple engineers and representa-
tives from popular third-party software vendors spent an afternoon demonstrating the power of 
the iMac Pro (Brownlee, 2017b; Gruber, 2017a). This strategy reveals two of Apple’s priorities 
around the rollout of the iMac Pro.  
First, the company prioritized the visual aesthetic of seriousness in its marketing of the 
product. Giving the first embargoed reviews of the device to YouTubers like Marques Brownlee 
and Jonathan Morrison ensured that the darker “Space Grey” finish would be visibly prominent 
and serve as a clear indicator of the “Pro” -ness of these iMacs. Morrison’s review takes the form 
of a “setup tour,” a standard technology video trope wherein the videographer gives a tour of 
their desk and all the technological products they use with slow-motion camera work and voiceo-
ver. Morrison even goes so far as to buy a new desk to color coordinate with the iMac Pro and 
excitedly explains that his favorite speakers already came in a matching shade of dark grey 
(Morrison, 2017). “I wanted to compliment and match that beautiful Space Grey finish,” Morri-
son says towards the start of the review before comparing every object on his desk to the specific 
shade of grey to the iMac Pro’s anodized aluminum chassis. The top comment on the YouTube 
video, below Morrison’s own obligatory self-promotion links, is from another technology re-
viewer who sarcastically critiques him, writing, “Why is that outdoor extension cord ORANGE 
and not space grey? wtf is this? amateur hour? great vid =)” (Dave 2D, 2017). 
Morrison barely touches on the technical specifications or the computer's performance in 
his video, despite this being one of the first reviews of the product to be officially sanctioned by 
Apple via their review unit seeding program. He jokingly tells those interested in “specs” to “get 
them wet naps ready,” presumably so that they can wipe away their saliva (Morrison, 2017). 
Moreover, while his counterpart, Marques Brownlee, aka MKBHD, does spend a bit more time 
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on the technical specifications and various speed tests, the aesthetic is a dominant topic in these 
two sanctioned reviews (Brownlee, 2017b).  In seeding two of the first review units of the iMac 
Pro to YouTubers and presumably emphasizing the computer’s visual attributes in the corre-
sponding briefs those videographers received, Apple strongly encouraged potential buyers to 
consider how the iMac Pro would look on their desks alongside what it could do for them. 
Through its review partners, the company hailed a class of knowledge worker interested in pre-
senting the appearance of professionalism and high status, especially creative pros like Morrison 
and Brownlee whose tasks are aided by the iMac Pro’s integrated 5k display.  
Apple’s second wave of pre-launch PR, spurred by the invite-only New York City briefing, 
exemplifies their second priority for the launch of the iMac Pro: justifying its $5000 starting 
price. During this event, traditional technology journalists from various trade publications and 
general interest magazines were shown demonstrations of demanding computational tasks per-
formed on the iMac Pro by Apple engineers and third-party software vendors. The demos in-
cluded three Virtual Reality (VR) applications, Apple’s Logic Pro X audio editing software, a 
Computer Aided Drawing (CAD) visualization program, and Apple’s Final Cut Pro X video edit-
ing software (Gruber, 2017a). Reviews emerging from this event were more focused on technical 
specifications and performance than the YouTube reviews, but this praise was always couched in 
examples from these specific demonstrations. For instance, on an episode of The Talk Show with 
John Gruber released later that week, Gruber and TechCrunch columnist Matthew Panzarino had 
a lengthy discussion about a demonstration of the iMac Pro’s ability to display three-dimensional 
CT scan results in VR. “For the cost of the medical equipment that’s in like a radiologist's lab,” 
Gruber said, “the $10,000 iMac is nothing, right?” (Gruber, 2017b). The Verge’s Dieter Bohn 
opened his review suggesting that most Apple fans refrain from purchasing the machine: 
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“The iMac Pro is available to order today, and if you’re a Mac user, you’re almost 
surely going to covet it. But for most people, it’s a better idea to covet this machine 
than it is to acquire it [emphasis in original]…Apple originally announced the iMac 
Pro back in June, so if you’re in the market for a computer like this, you likely already 
know most of what I’m about to tell you” (Bohn, 2017) 
Apple was trying to combat sticker shock by limiting the conditions under which reviewers from 
widely read industry publications could experience the iMac Pro before its release. Circum-
stances such as these present the iMac Pro as a sort of luxury tool, intended only for those whose 
work requires considerable computational power or whose checking accounts can withstand a 
withdrawal of $5000 or more on a relatively frequent basis. It is presented as a high-end com-
puter for high-end users that ‘need it for their work,’ and that work is overwhelmingly within the 
creative industries. All but one of the applications demonstrated to these reviewers involved cre-
ating video, audio, visual art, or architectural renderings.  
Noticeably absent from the New York event was Apple’s own software development pro-
gram, X Code. Much of the outrage about the perceived abandonment of the “Trash Can” Mac 
Pro came from software developers, and yet their use cases were not even presented to the press. 
Part-time developer Craig Hunter was seeded a review unit in the first batch, alongside Brownlee 
and Morrison. Still, his review primarily focused on his full-time position as an aerospace engi-
neer (Hunter, 2017). The lack of a straightforward developer story in the PR campaign surround-
ing the iMac Pro’s launch seems to demonstrate Apple’s awareness that the all-in-one form fac-
tor, with its lack of user-upgradable internal components, was not the ideal solution for all pro-
fessionals. Rather than attempt to appease this audience, Apple chose to push the iMac Pro to 
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aesthetically minded workers in the creative industries in hopes that the promise of an imminent 
Mac Pro would keep developers from railing against their new all-in-one desktop computer. 
Toward the end of his initial review video, Marques Brownlee calls the iMac Pro “the ideal 
high-end YouTuber Final Cut Pro machine,” and this characterization seems to be in line with 
how Apple itself viewed the machine. As prominent status symbols with growing influence in 
popular culture, YouTubers would be a reasonable target for a computer that is as concerned 
with its appearance as its performance. Sure enough, dozens of unboxing videos appeared when 
the iMac Pro began shipping to customers in early 2018, and the reactions from “Professional” 
YouTubers were overwhelmingly positive. Prominent Apple fan Justine Ezarik, aka iJustine, 
even cried tears of joy on camera when her iMac Pro arrived a day early, saying, “I cannot wait 
to edit on this sweet, sweet machine” (Ezarik, 2018). Creative workers like Ezarik, Brownlee, 
and Morrison illustrate Eisenman’s (2013) contention that “in the context of a technology that, 
while evolving, is evolving fairly incrementally, consumers are motivated to purchase new prod-
uct models that have design attributes that potentially excite them and that effectively convey a 
sense of progress via novelty in design.”  
Apple felt that they could capitalize on the excitement that arises from a novelty in design 
and their brand's aspirational status to create a “Pro” desktop that used the same all-in-one form 
factor as their consumer-grade machines, aesthetically firming up their Four Quadrants product 
strategy. Consistent praise for their industrial design and the iMac's continued sales success 
seems to have validated the continuation of this strategy. However, as developers and trade jour-
nalists began to raise concerns about the aging “trash can” Mac Pro Apple was forced to 
acknowledge that their adherence to this design had been misguided. Even before the iMac Pro 
reveal at WWDC 2017, Apple had promised a Pro computer that would outperform it. Further 
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analysis of this announcement will reveal how that process determined the nature of Apple’s re-
sponse and the new definition of “professional” they adopted when designing the 2019 Mac Pro. 
4.4 The Mac Pro 
Apple CEO Time Cook opened the announcement of the Mac Pro at WWDC 2019 by emphasiz-
ing that the employees at Apple “love the Mac, and our customers do too. In fact, the Mac is the 
number one in customer satisfaction by far in the industry” (Apple — WWDC 2019 Keynote, 
2019). This remark’s thinly veiled attempt to reassure the fanbase grew even more obvious as he 
continued his speech: 
“For Mac users looking to really push the limits of performance. There is one more 
spot in our lineup that the team has been working really hard to fill, to create a product 
that will take Mac further than it's ever gone before. And I am so excited and thrilled 
to show it to you now…” (Apple — WWDC 2019 Keynote, 2019) 
What followed was the launch video for the modular Mac Pro tower that Apple had promised 
two years earlier at the Roundtable event. This machine, which was met with thunderous ap-
plause and rave reactions from attendees and pundits, addressed all the complaints leveled 
against the iMac Pro and its predecessor, the Trash Can Mac Pro. 
 The remainder of this section will analyze the press materials surrounding that machine’s 
launch, the company’s PR strategy in its rollout and the first reviews of the hardware. Based 
upon these sources, it is apparent that while Apple intended the Mac Pro to be a concession to its 
most offended Pro users it was also viewed as an opportunity to contain those users within its 
new brand strategy. The concessions Apple made, in terms of hardware and product design, 
broaden the scope of their “Pro” line and emphasize function over form while paying homage to 
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the specific wants and needs of developers and other traditional market segments. The modular-
ity and expandability of the Mac Pro is the most notable of these concessions, but even this is 
controlled (albeit slightly) by Apple via the machine’s proprietary cooling architecture. The ex-
tremely limited PR campaign surrounding the release and the choice to provide review units ex-
clusively to high profile YouTube creators demonstrates Apple’s continued struggle to negotiate 
the relationship between influencers and the broader Mac fandom. Within their evolving PR 
strategy, the company designated Alpha fans within all four quadrants of Jobs’ product market-
ing grid. Those designated Alphas became the easily contained conduits between the fandom and 
the organization, beholden as they were to embargos, non-disclosure agreements and PR talking 
points.  
4.5 Mac Pro Press Kit Analysis 
Where the iMac Pro’s launch video focused on thinness, dark colors and classic rock riffs the 
Mac Pro’s reveal is much more understated. A series of staccato notes played on a piano over a 
bed of strings accompanies a corresponding set of extreme close-ups of the Mac Pro’s ventilation 
ports, handles, feet and power button. The final reveal is a wide shot of the computer tower, situ-
ated on a slowly rotating pedestal on-stage with its accompanying monitor and the monitor’s in-
famous articulated stand. Its physical presence in the room combined with the return to a more 
traditional tower-like design elicited thunderous applause from the developers and journalists in 




Figure 8: Still from Mac Pro Reveal Video 
(Apple — WWDC 2019 Keynote, 2019) 
When John Ternus took to the stage after the video he summed up the contrast with the iMac Pro 
succinctly, saying “As you can see, utility and function define the device…” (Apple — WWDC 
2019 Keynote, 2019). That’s a far cry from his remarks two years earlier when he and Cook 
made cavalier declarations about bad ass colors and sinister aesthetics. For this device, Ternus 
explains that Apple “focused on delivering real world performance where it matters most” (Ap-
ple — WWDC 2019 Keynote, 2019). 
 To emphasize this supposed “real world performance” Ternus spent most of his presenta-
tion explaining the various components of the Mac Pro in front of 3D renders which showed how 
the machine could be opened and various parts could be swapped out. “…In designing this prod-
uct,” he said, “we wanted to build an architecture that can meet the incredible diversity of Pro 
needs, a system that offers virtually unlimited possibilities for customization” (Apple — WWDC 
2019 Keynote, 2019). The audience at WWDC and online was especially excited for the return of 
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PCI expansion, which would allow users to remove and replace expansion cards such as graphics 
modules, input/output cards and other features to meet more granular specifications than those 
offered in Apple’s available inventory. 
 
 
Figure 9: John Ternus discussing the Mac Pro’s internals, in front of a 3D rendered cross 
section of the computer 
(Apple — WWDC 2019 Keynote, 2019) 
Of course, the company also offered their own proprietary spin on this industry standard by col-
laborating with chipmaker AMD on graphics modules which were “double wide” PCI cards and 
included cooling systems specifically designed for the Mac Pro’s case. These would be available 
for purchase via Apple, but third-party cards would also be supported if users desired different 
configurations. Expansion, collaboration with third party chip vendors and an open admission of 
professional diversity were all surprising departures from the tone Apple had set with the Mac 
Pro just 24 months earlier. Ternus’s presentation made it seem as though Apple had learned its 
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lesson and was willing to compromise on its brand priorities of simplicity and status-based mar-
keting to deliver a product that was more suited to the demands made by their most offended 
“Pro” users. 
 Where the iMac Pro presentation consistently mentioned how the hardware engineers at 
Apple had packed pro performance into the compact body of an iMac, the Mac Pro was pre-
sented as being unapologetically large and designed around its modularity. Parallels to the first-
generation “Cheese Grater” Mac Pro and other traditional tower-like PC’s were the subtext of 
this discussion, as the company attempted to assure its customers that they would not be backed 
into another “thermal corner” like they had been with the “Trash Can” Mac Pro. 
 
Figure 10: 2019 Mac Pro next to the “Trash Can” Mac Pro 
(Morrison, 2019) 
Tim Cook only called the Mac Pro “gorgeous” once and John Ternus described its aluminum 
housing as “beautiful,” however these remarks were made in service of the product’s functional-
ity. “The beautiful aluminum housing slides over the frame and latches into place…allowing 360 
degree access to the internals,” Ternus told the audience (Apple — WWDC 2019 Keynote, 2019). 
The new Mac Pro’s entire frontispiece was made up of uniquely machined ventilation holes, 
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which the company argued would “maximize airflow while creating an extremely rigid system,” 
a far-cry from the hidden ventilation slits in the bottom of the iMac Pro’s monitor housing. 
 The refrain of flexibility and internal access was repeated in the Jony Ive narrated design 
showcase video uploaded to Apple’s YouTube channel a few weeks after WWDC. Ive explains 
that the new machine was built around a stainless steel ‘space frame’ which “serves as the foun-
dation for absolute flexibility and uncompromising utility” (Apple, Inc., 2019). As he speaks 
these lines a Mac Pro is assembled component-by-component against a white backdrop until a 
single human hand is shown placing the final PCI card into the frame. Ive notes that the frame 
offers “360 degree access and multiple mounting points for different components” (Apple, Inc., 
2019). This repeated reference to 360-degree access may seem redundant, but Apple’s emphasis 
underscores the unique value proposition of this design feature. In an era when most Macs (and 
many PC’s) offer little to no access to their internal components the new Mac Pro does away 
with all the company’s previous logic of effacement. If the iMac has always been about “the 
seeming immateriality of the design,” (Schaefer & Gigi Durham, 2007) the new Mac Pro was 
meant to assure its users that they could once again exercise agency and indeed mastery over 
their computer’s various component parts. In the second segment of this introduction video, 
hardware engineer Dan Riccio narrates a list of potential expansions and modifications users can 
undertake via this access, which he claims will “allow users to build a system that fits their 
needs” (Apple, Inc., 2019). Riccio’s statement is underscored by on-screen text driving home the 
point that Apple is aware of diversity in professional needs and will not attempt to build a one-
size-fits-all system to address this audience.  
 As with all their previous products, Apple’s on-stage demonstrations effectively tele-
graphed the “Pros” that made up the intended audience for this new Mac Pro. John Ternus noted 
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that “one of the most critical areas of expansion is graphics. graphics performance is so im-
portant for tasks like animating 3d film assets or compositing 8k scenes, or building complex 3d 
environments…” (Apple — WWDC 2019 Keynote, 2019). He also shared that the company had 
been collaborating with software vendors such as Adobe, Avid and AutoDesk whose products 
were widely used in the creative and engineering fields. A member of Apple’s “Pro Software Di-
vision” provided demonstrations of new audio and video editing software (Logic Pro & Final Cut 
Pro, respectively) which could handle more media simultaneously than ever before while apply-
ing complex special effects in real time. Perhaps most notably though, Ternus spent a great deal 
of the presentation discussing Apple’s new Afterburner card, a “programmable accelerator,” 
which the company claimed could speed up many workflows but was designed for processing 
extremely high-resolution video files in their proprietary Pro-Res Raw format. For all of their 
talk of flexibility and diversity of professional use cases, Apple executives still referred to the 
Mac Pro as “absolutely, by far the most power, powerful Mac that’s ever been created for profes-
sional filmmakers and musicians” (Apple — WWDC 2019 Keynote, 2019). 
 The emphasis on the creative profession was most obvious in the subsequent presentation 
on the ProDisplay XDR, a 30-inch monitor which cost nearly as much as the Mac Pro itself and 
shipped without the $999 stand needed to place it on a desk. Widespread laughter is clearly audi-
ble at the announcement of this pricing during the WWDC Keynote, with its audience of soft-
ware developers who have little use for the display’s “Extreme Dynamic Range” and individu-
ally color calibrated LEDs. In fact, the only specific reference to software developers during this 
segment was a quick sidenote about the display’s stand being able to rotate it to a vertical orien-
tation that would be “great for writing code” (Apple — WWDC 2019 Keynote, 2019). Presenter 
Colleen Novielli made it clear that this monitor, while functional for writing code, was intended 
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for a much more specific use case. She compared the Pro Display XDR to film reference moni-
tors, which are used in color correction for television and motion picture production. Such dis-
plays, she explained “do deliver true HDR…but they're still missing [key] features. And they're 
incredibly expensive. This one's [a competitive display from Sony and it costs] $43,000” (Apple 
— WWDC 2019 Keynote, 2019). In this context, Apple claimed, they were providing an “extraor-
dinary display” at a bargain price that would “deliver every feature on a pro’s wish list and 
more,” if that Pro worked in a visual medium. 
 Based on the information included in the announcement at WWDC the new Mac Pro ap-
peared to be aimed at a class of user who needed the most powerful components possible and 
was willing and able to update them without much help from Apple. The constant emphasis on 
internal access, customization and expandability was a clear shift in direction from the iMac Pro, 
which was pitched as being so powerful it wouldn’t need upgrading. The use of industry standard 
PCI expansion slots corrected for the proprietary technologies which slowed down updates to the 
Trash Can Mac Pro. And the occasional one-liners thrown to software developers and other pro-
fessionals outside of the creative industries seemed to appease their demands, even if the ma-
chine’s $5999 starting price and optional $699 wheels did not. Apple’s choice to return to indus-
try standard designs and expansion opportunities, combined with their admission of failure dur-
ing the Mac Roundtable Event in 2017 signaled a return to their evangelistic Mac user audience. 
However, the rollout of review units prior to the first shipments of Mac Pros in late 2019 re-
vealed that the company hadn’t undergone a complete change of strategy. 
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4.5.1 Mac Pro Review Process Analysis 
As with the iMac Pro, the Mac Pro’s intended audience would be further delineated through Ap-
ple’s shipment of free hardware to individuals and publications in exchange for reviews. How-
ever, in some ways the Mac Pro was defined more by who did not receive review units. No trade 
publications received advance hardware, and most were forced to wait and purchase their Mac 
Pros alongside consumers in December 2019, when shipments were almost immediately delayed 
into early 2020 due to high demand. Some pundits, such as podcaster and journalist Jason Snell, 
were not offended by this as they felt that their workflows were more suited to the iMac Pro and 
didn’t require the technical prowess of the Mac Pro (Hurley & Snell, 2019). When some fans 
balked at the price of the product and Apple’s willingness to charge over $40,000 for the most 
intensely customized variants, Snell wrote a column for MacWorld titled, “The Mac Pro is an 
important symbol, here’s why you probably shouldn’t buy it” (Snell, 2019). Others, including the 
hosts of the aforementioned Accidental Tech Podcast agreed that they didn’t need such a power-
ful computer, but conceded that they wanted it for its symbolic value (Arment et al., 2019).  
 As they had with the iMac Pro, Apple seeded a small batch of computers to popular tech-
nology YouTubers. This time though, only three channels were given exclusive access to the 
new hardware: iJustine (aka Justine Ezarik), MKBHD (aka Marques Brownlee) and Jonathan 
Morrison. All three of these individuals had received review hardware in the past, including the 
iMac Pro, and all were well established as professional videographers with over 1 million 
YouTube subscribers. Their approaches to the review, while hewing mostly to Apple’s clearly 
specified guidelines, still manage to show a diversity of approaches to this highly anticipated 
gadget and the marketing campaign pitching towards “Pro” users. Each video begins with an un-
boxing, a trope within YouTube technology reviews, wherein the on-camera personality opens 
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the product and discusses its packaging and aesthetic appearance. In the case of the Mac Pro, a 
considerable amount of the unboxing time was spent discussing the quality of the packaging and 
its “premium” feel, a sign of Apple’s and the reviewers’ continuing fascination with luxury and 
Alpha fans. From there the reviews diverge, as each YouTuber approaches the discussion of 
technical specifications and the testing of hardware features based on their own workstyle. By 
contrasting the detailed review portions, this section will delineate the three variants of “Pro” 
that Apple hoped would be interested in the Mac Pro. 
 Marques Brownlee, or MKBHD as he is known on YouTube, has a reputation for work-
ing with the most powerful hardware available and wastes little time getting to the detailed speci-
fication of the Mac Pro. Two and a half minutes into his eleven-minute video he starts listing sta-
tistics and test results, which he continues throughout the remainder of the piece.  
 
Figure 11: Brownlee discusses 8k video render times for Pro Macs 
(Brownlee, 2019) 
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He concedes to the audience that he has, in fact, been editing on the Mac Pro for two weeks prior 
to the release of his review and found that it handled his ultra-high resolution 8k video footage 
better than any other machine in his studio. He notes that he is particularly impressed by the 
video render speed, which results in wait times less than half of those he experienced on his iMac 
Pro (Brownlee, 2019). Towards the end of the video, Brownlee attempts to situate the Mac Pro 
within the context of creativity and productivity, saying:  
“I feel like at this point, you know in 2019-2020, it takes a lot to get me inspired as a 
creator, because the tools I have at my disposal are so unlimited. Like there's no way 
I can take this [Red 8k] camera to its full potential. But I was pretty consistently push-
ing the iMac Pro, the fastest machine that runs Final Cut Pro, to its full potential. So, 
it's not like magic. It's not like having this Mac Pro is going to make my videos better 
or make anyone's videos better. But it's just…sort of a headroom unlocker. Essentially 
it pulls down the barrier for what I'm willing to try as a creator because of power, or 
speed or time” (Brownlee, 2019) 
Brownlee’s mix of programming jargon such as “headroom” and creative ambition speaks to a 
class of professionals who view the output of their work as art but feel that their creativity is 
strained by the tools at hand. His pitch for the Mac Pro is essentially that it will allow him to re-
move that restraint for some undetermined period, presumably until higher and higher resolution 
video or newer faster machines force him to upgrade. Professional hardware then, follows the 
model outlined by Ross and Arment, wherein computers are the craft tools of a new sort of trade 
and the most advanced computers are tied to the most technically complex labor. 
 Jonathan Morrison’s review is every bit as technical as Brownlee’s but includes a much 
longer unboxing and clocks in at nearly nineteen minutes of total runtime, the longest of the 
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three officially sanctioned reviews. His style is much less formal than Brownlee’s and he fre-
quently makes light jokes at the expense of other tech pundits, Apple fans and the company it-
self. Upon unboxing the Pro Stand for the Pro Display XDR, which had received audible laughs 
at the launch event, Morrison anthropomorphizes it, saying “You are so freaking beautiful, don’t 
ever let anybody tell you that you are not worth $1,000” (Morrison, 2019). When running com-
mon benchmarking tests on the machine such as the Geekbench CPU test or the CineBlend 3D 
rendering model he jokes about the reliance other reviews place on these arbitrary measures. 
“We gotta see this thing flex just a little bit, to make Leo Laporte happy…we’ll even throw a lit-
tle power gadget in there just for the Linus Tech Tips crowd” he jokes, referencing the host of 
the long-running podcast This Week in Tech and another popular technology YouTuber 
(Morrison, 2019). Morrison’s appeals to the fandom and his decision to run their preferred 
benchmarks on camera rather than simply reporting the results, as Brownlee does, demonstrates 
a perceived alignment with the Mac userbase.  
Like Brownlee, Morrison mentions that he has been working with the machine off-screen 
but takes it a step further by bringing in collaborators from other fields, including musicians and 
photographers, to test other workflows. These results are not reported, likely due to Apple’s di-
rection for the videos to focus on unboxing and first impressions, but the short clips we are 





Figure 12: Morrison and Collaborators work at a Mac Pro 
(Morrison, 2019) 
This review demonstrates the most diverse range of uses for the Mac Pro and argues for its status 
as a “Pro” machine by virtue of its raw metrics rather than the specific use case of video editing. 
Morrison clearly intended to speak to the fan base and assuage their concerns about the new ma-
chine. He accomplished this by using familiar metrics, namedropping other popular figures in the 
fandom and bringing in other “Pros” to work on the machine even though it is unclear if this was 
a violation of the terms of the review, as no other reviewers did so. Morrison’s review argues 
that Apple not only cares about the Mac but is as excited as fans are for this latest generation of 
high-end computer. 
 Fannish excitement is a key element of Justine Ezarik’s videos on her iJustine channel, 
and her unboxing and review of the Mac Pro is no exception. She exclaims emotionally through-
out the unboxing that “I just can’t believe this is in my house,” and upon booting up the machine 
she asks “Is everyone okay? Am I okay? I’m not sure” (Ezarik, 2019). After the unboxing she 
even brings out her 2009 “Cheese Grater” Mac Pro for an emotional side-by-side comparison of 
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her first Pro Mac and the new computer. Justine does not typically shoot the high-resolution foot-
age for which the Mac Pro was ostensibly built, so she rented three 8K cameras and hired a 
three-person crew to film her unboxing, which would then give her footage to edit in the review 
section. For her, this project is as much a celebration of the Apple brand and its latest accom-
plishment as it is a review of a high-end computer. To add b-roll to the video she even visits the 
Apple Store where she waited in line over night for her first iPhone and talks about how im-
portant that moment was in her engagement with the brand. “I have a lot of memories here,” she 
says, “I slept outside here for 55-plus hours for the iPhone 6…this place has a very special place 
in my heart, especially this Apple Store” (Ezarik, 2019). 
 
 
Figure 13: Ezarik’s trip to the Apple Store during her review video 
(Ezarik, 2019) 
Ezarik’s review contains the least technical information of the three officially sanctioned videos 
in Apple’s initial press push for the Mac Pro. She briefly discusses the quality of the Pro Display 
XDR in a voiceover which plays on top of time lapse footage of her editing at the Mac Pro. She 
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also mentions the need for additional storage drives to compensate for the size of the 8k footage 
she has shot, but otherwise spends much of her time admiring the machine’s aesthetics and ex-
pressing joy at the mere existence of a new “Pro” Mac in her life. Her review is representative of 
the Alpha fans whose engagement with Apple products is largely symbolic and focused on their 
aesthetic qualities and the status they imbue, as discussed by Marwick. 
 As this analysis has shown, Apple’s three sanctioned reviews of the Mac Pro presented 
the product to three different segments of their ideal audience. Brownlee’s video addressed crea-
tive professionals with a first-hand account of how the machine fit into the workflow of a video 
production studio over the course of two weeks of work. Morrison’s review addressed the larger 
technology community and the subset which overlapped with the Apple fandom by focusing on 
standard benchmarks and appealing to in-group references. Finally, Ezarik’s video spoke to the 
group Kawasaki called “The Cult of Apple,” the Alpha fans whose excitement about this ma-
chine was tied primarily to its brand association and secondarily to its functionality. The Mac Pro 
may have been intended as a course correction for the more Alpha-focused iMac Pro and its aspi-
rational prosumer audience. However, the reliance on influencers and fandom figures to promote 
this high-end product shows the company’s attempt to reconcile their reputation as a lifestyle 
brand with the demands of their less fashion-forward customers. If Pro Mac users wouldn’t buy 
into an influencer-focused product, Apple would simply focus their influencers on the products 
that those customers would buy. These videos may not have convinced any new customers to 
purchase a Mac Pro, but they served as a reassurance of Apple’s commitment and its values to 
the fanbase. Here, they argued, was a truly Pro Mac; a machine so powerful that creators had to 
buy new cameras to accommodate it. This, they argued, was the upper limit of the Fourth Quad-
rant. 
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5 CONCLUSION  
Six months after Apple unveiled the redesigned Mac Pro the company announced that they were 
undertaking a two-year transition during which their Mac products would shift from Intel-based 
Central Processing Units to in-house designed Apple Silicon chips. CEO Tim Cook claimed that 
these new CPUs would “make the Mac stronger and more capable than ever,” adding that “I’ve 
never been more excited about the future of the Mac” (Apple Inc., 2020). Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
the first Macs to transition that fall were the consumer-focused MacBook Air and Mac Mini. 
However, the technical improvements over Intel Macs were monumental, with the Mac Mini 
even outperforming the iMac Pro on some benchmark tests (Hansen, 2020). Just before unveiling 
a new crop of Apple Silicon powered consumer iMacs, which would certainly yield negative 
press surrounding said benchmarks, Apple quietly discontinued the Intel-based iMac Pro in the 
Spring of 2021 (Simon, 2021). As of this writing the all-in-one pro desktop shows no sign of re-
turning, though the company is rumored to be producing two new modular tower-like Mac Pro 
products based upon their proprietary CPU architecture (Clover, 2021). This pivot in Pro hard-
ware strategy demonstrates Apple’s return to the Four Quadrants strategy even as they vertically 




Table 2: Updated Four Quadrant Strategy Diagram 
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Apple revised its PR strategy to include more podcasters and bloggers popular within the Apple 
fandom following the 2017 Mac Roundtable event. This strategy accelerated through the release 
of the 2018 Mac Mini, which was the first piece of promotional hardware given to Marco Ar-
ment as an Accidental Tech Podcast (Arment, 2018). Arment’s colleagues Casey Liss and John 
Siracusa also received their first invites to product launch events as members of the press corps 
during this period (Arment et al., 2018). At subsequent WWDC conferences Apple even pro-
vided an on-site podcast studio where attendees could book time to record recaps of the confer-
ence for their listeners (Kahn, 2018). Well respected fan podcasts, as well as those hosted by ex-
isting Apple PR contacts, began receiving exclusive interviews with executives coinciding with 
key product launches (Hurley & Snell, 2021). The incorporation of these fan publications into 
the PR machinery of the corporation, while welcomed by fans, quickly became a new method of 
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containment as podcast episodes and YouTube videos were held under embargo and subjected to 
specified talking points and non-disclosure agreements. Thus, Apple was able to improve its rep-
utation with the fandom simply by widening its circle of Alphas to include trusted voices from 
semi-professional outlets that maintained a good relationship with the Cult of Mac.  
 The controversy analyzed in this thesis demonstrates the power of fan intervention during 
times of crisis brought on by industrial externalities. Factors ranging from supply chain manage-
ment issues to executive turnover and strategic realignment caused Apple to move away from a 
core piece of industrial lore which it had publicly communicated to its fans. When the “Trash 
Can” Mac Pro’s lack of updates made the crisis of planned obsolescence and the rejection of the 
Four Quadrants strategy apparent, fans fought back and insisted upon a specific style of desktop 
computer. Apple’s rushed announcement and subsequent cancellation of the iMac Pro demon-
strated that the company had been forced to concede to these demands and build a modular sys-
tem more suited to the diversity of professional use cases. The timing of these events, within a 
period of larger technological upheaval including the increased popularity of mobile technolo-
gies and the transition to Apple Silicon provided a fraught scene which amplified the interven-
tions of what might otherwise have been a vocal minority of Mac users. However, the fandom’s 
success in eliciting an apology and strategic redirection from one of the world’s largest compa-
nies demonstrates that a well-timed campaign of sustained textual production can shift the bal-
ance of power towards the will of the consumer. 
 Future analyses bridging the gap between industrial and fan studies should be mindful of 
the example set by these “Pro” Mac users. Their perception of abandonment and spitefulness re-
sulting from the breach of industrial lore should be compared to negative responses to textual 
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change in other fandoms. The containment of dissenting voices within fandom via professionali-
zation (i.e., providing pre-release hardware for review) should also be considered as a means for 
corporate control of consumer discourse. Structural analysis of fan publishing platforms will also 
be necessary to determine the financial and reputational consequences for those creators who 
publicly voice dissent within established communities. Finally, as the economies of the United 
States and other western nations continue to shift from production to knowledge and service-
based labor the definition of professionalism and the nature of products marketed to “working 
professionals” should be a continual topic of analysis. 
This thesis has demonstrated that Apple’s founder and CEO Steve Jobs created and perpetu-
ated a product marketing strategy, The Four Quadrants, which became a vital element of the in-
dustrial lore of the company. His passing and subsequent changes in Apple’s business model cre-
ated tension between the expectations of the company’s intentionally cultivated evangelistic 
fanbase and the Mac hardware design team. By analyzing the ensuing controversy through the 
lenses of both media industrial discourse analysis and fan studies, this thesis posits that fandom 
has the power to intervene in such moments of thwarted expectation. However, this power is lim-
ited by the logic of neoliberal capital, particularly the cycle of crisis that results from planned ob-
solescence. Fans may argue for products that serve their specific needs more effectively, but they 
will still be required to purchase them at a premium. Their excitement about each new product 
rumor demonstrates their pleas to be “fleeced,” while their critical reviews of these products 
upon release push the industry to shift their strategies. Such interventions are, at best, a minor 
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